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1. INTRODUCTION
In the ongoing debate regarding sex-Segregated education, 2011 was
another busy year. On September 22, the New York Times, Washington
Post, and ABC News reported on a recent study published in Science
magazine rejecting "The Pseudoscience of Single Sex Schooling." In
April, a decision was issued in Doe v. Vermilion Parish School Board ,
the first federal appellate case on single-sex education since 1996, when
the United States Supreme Court struck down sex segregation at the
Virginia Military Institute. At issue in Vermilion Parish was a school
initiative encouraged by Department of Education regulations passed in
2006 explicitly allowing public single-sex education, and after the Fifth
1. Tamar Lewin, Single-Sex Education Is Assailed in Report, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/education/23single.html.
2. Michael Alison Chandler, Study: Single-Sex Education May Do More Harm
than Good, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/
study-single-sex-education-may-do-more-harm-than-good/2011/09/22/gIQABAQOoK
story.html?hpid=z4.
3. Mikaela Conley, Single-Sex Schools Have Negative Impact on Kids, Says
Study, ABC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/single-sex-schools-
negative-kids-study/story?id=14581023.
4. 421 F. App'x 366 (5th Cir. 2011).
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Circuit remanded the case for a determination regarding mootness,5 the
school district decided to cease all sex-segregated classes. 6
These recent events are only the latest developments in one of the
most enduring educational debates of the past three decades, a debate
that can often look confusing, given the number of debaters and the
diversity of their perspectives and agendas. More than this diversity,
however, the debate is confusing because it has been structured as a
contest between the "innovation" of sex-segregated education and status
quo coeducation. Missing from the debate is a comparison between
reformed coeducation and a single-sex alternative, a comparison that is
markedly more useful in determining what ought to be done about the
problems animating the debate, particularly problems of gender equity in
education and society.
Also missing from the debate are comprehensive constitutional analyses
of sex-segregated education generally and sex-segregated programs in
K-12 public schools in particular. Most articles simply discuss the two
main Supreme Court cases involving sex-segregated education, Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan7 and United States v. Virginia,8 as well
as Vorchheimer v. School District,9 where a divided Court was unable to
make a decision as to the constitutionality of a pair of sex-segregated
public high schools.' 0 Those who have done a more comprehensive
5. Id. at 376.
6. Doe v. Vermilion Parish School Board, ACLU (Oct. 18, 2011), http://
www.aclu.org/womens-rights/doe-v-vermilion-parish-school-board.
7. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
8. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
9. 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (mem.) (per curiam), aff'g by an equally divided Court
532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
10. See, e.g., David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the
Essentialist Myth of Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135, 147-48 (2009); Jill Elaine Hasday,
The Principle and Practice of Women's "Full Citizenship": A Case Study of Sex-
Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 756 (2002); Nancy Levit,
Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex
Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 456-60 (1999); Isabelle Katz Pinzler,
Separate but Equal Education in the Context of Gender, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 785,
792-94 (2004); Gary J. Simson, Separate but Equal and Single-Sex Schools, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 443, 444-45 (2005); Juliet A. Williams, Learning Differences: Sex-
Role Stereotyping in Single-Sex Public Education, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 555, 566-68
(2010) [hereinafter Williams, Learning Differences]; Verna L. Williams, Reform or
Retrenchment? Single-Sex Education and the Construction of Race and Gender, 2004
Wis. L. REV. 15, 31-36 [hereinafter Williams, Reform]; Benjamin P. Carr, Note, Can
Separate Be Equal? Single-Sex Classrooms, the Constitution, and Title IX, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 409, 413-20 (2007); Ashley Elizabeth Johnson, Note, Single-Sex Classes
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analysis have focused on only one aspect of the constitutional test."
This Article therefore began as an attempt to conduct a comprehensive
analysis and to apply to sex-segregated K-12 public education the
"intermediate scrutiny" test used by the U.S. Supreme Court in reviewing
government action utilizing sex-based classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause.
In attempting to apply this test, however, it soon became clear that
much of the variation in opinion as to sex-segregated education's
constitutionality derives from the Court's equal protection jurisprudence
itself. Many have looked at this jurisprudence at varying levels of detail
and comprehensiveness, developing a rich literature with a wide variety
of normative and descriptive perspectives on the issue. With regard to
the intermediate scrutiny test adopted by the Court to review sex
classifications in particular, scholars have engaged in several debates
related to certain indeterminacies in the Court's case decisions. 12 For
instance, some scholars view the Court's approach as being akin to, if
not more exacting than, the "strict scrutiny" standard the Court uses in
race classification cases.13 In contrast, others have concluded that
intermediate scrutiny is virtually the same as the "rational basis" scrutiny
test used by the Court for all other classifications besides race and
gender.14 Still others have pointed out, based on empirical studies, that
intermediate scrutiny exists between strict scrutiny and rational basis
scrutiny in terms of the frequency with which the Court invalidates
statutes awarding differing benefits or rights to different classifications
of people.' 5 As a result, a common criticism of the Court's approach is
that it is "vague, poorly defined and malleable, providing insufficient
in Public Secondary Schools: Maximizing the Value of a Public Education for the
Nation's Students, 57 VAND. L. REV. 629, 642-52 (2004); Rebecca A. Kiselewich, Note,
In Defense of the 2006 Title IX Regulations for Single-Sex Public Education: How
Separate Can Be Equal, 49 B.C. L. REv. 217, 234 (2008).
11. See, e.g., Kimberly J. Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation
ofPublic Single-Sex Elementary and Secondary Schools, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1953,
1974-76 (2006).
12. For a general discussion of various commentaries on this issue, see Lee Epstein
et al., Constitutional Sex Discrimination, 1 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 11, 25-34 (2004).
13. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L.
REv. 1447, 1450 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and the Application of
Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 PEPP.
L. REv. 185, 187 (2003).
15. See Epstein et al., supra note 12, at 48-49.
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guidance in individual cases and giving broad discretion to individual
judges" to decide cases however they want."
Therefore, this Article seeks both to address the lack of comprehensive
analyses regarding the constitutionality of sex-segregated K-12 public
education and to untangle the underlying debate regarding the Court's
application of the intermediate scrutiny test. In undertaking this analysis, it
posits a new way to look at the Court's jurisprudence regarding legislation
that facially classifies based on sex, one that suggests that the Court's
jurisprudence may be more consistent and predictable than most
commentators have suggested up to this point. It then applies this
jurisprudence to sex-segregated K-12 public education. In doing so, it
pays particular attention to the reformed coeducation and sex-segregated
education comparison as the proper one for analyzing the constitutionality
of single-sex education. It concludes that, when assessing whether a
classification substantially advances an important government objective
under the Supreme Court's thirty-year-plus line of cases beginning with
Reed v. Reed17 and ending with Flores-Villar v. United States," it is
extremely useful and possibly necessary to compare the sex classification
with sex-neutral alternatives for advancing that objective.
Sex-segregated K-12 public education is the focus of this Article's
application of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence for three
reasons. First, only public education programs involve state action
reviewable for its constitutionality.19 Second, K-12 public education
educates the vast majority of Americans. 2 0 Third, K- 12 public education
is the "last (educational) resort" for American children in the sense that,
absent conduct qualifying for expulsion, all children are both guaranteed
16. Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their
Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J.
1201, 1213 (2005) (summarizing critiques from lower courts, scholars, and Justice
Souter's comments at his Supreme Court confirmation hearing).
17. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
18. 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam).
19. See generally Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of
Democratic Choice, 34 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1379 (2006) (discussing the requirement of
state action to bring constitutional challenges).
20. Michael A. Resnick, An American Imperative: Public Education, CENTER FOR
PUB. EDUC. (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/
Public-education/An-American-imperative-Public-education-.
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a space in the appropriate K-12 public school and required by compulsory
attendance laws to attend that school.21
In light of the simultaneous "last resort" and compulsory nature of
K-12 public education, combined with the potentially wide impact of
sex-segregated programs in K-12 public schools, this Article is particularly
concerned with any harms attendant to K-12 public sex-segregated
education. That is, because sex-segregated K-12 public education occurs
in a context where students' and families' choices have hard limits, even
when participation in a sex-segregated program is facially voluntary, any
constitutional review must be sensitive to the potentially harmful effects
of the program not only on the students who choose sex-segregated
education but also on the students who do not choose such programs.
In fact, both recent litigation and research regarding sex-segregated
K-12 public education indicates that the harms are significant. Indeed,
several troubling aspects have recently emerged in current sex-segregated
22programs. As an initial matter, logistical problems that arise from the
aforementioned characteristics of K-12 public schools often cause schools
to reduce or eliminate students' and parents' ability to choose sex-
segregated or coeducation, making participation in single-sex programs
not fully voluntary. More importantly, however, evidence suggests that
some sex-segregation proponents are manipulating school boards and
teachers who know neither the research nor the law related to sex-
segregated education. 2 3 This unawareness, in turn, often causes schools
to rely on brain research that is at best highly contested by scientists and
24at worst rife with gender stereotypes. A more balanced perspective on
the brain research, moreover, suggests that in actuality, stereotyping can
cause serious, nontheoretical harm to children's learning abilities and
educational achievements-the exact opposite effect that single-sex
education proponents advance as the purpose of adopting sex-segregated
programs.25 In addition, studies have shown that learning alongside the
opposite sex can help students develop better and more balanced skills,
whereas existing sex segregation-which is actually quite widespread in
21. See id; Compulsory School Age Requirements, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(June 2010), http://www.ncsI.org/documents/educ/ECSCompulsoryAge.pdf; Contemporary
Education Issues, K12 ACADEMICS, http://www.kl2academics.com/education-united-
states/contemporary-education-issues (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
22. See Diane F. Halpem et al., The Pseudoscience of Single-Sex Schooling, 333
SCIENCE 1706, 1706-07 (2011).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1707.
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current coeducational schools-often leads to "troublesome gaps" for
both sexes. 26
The last resort, compulsory nature and potentially wide impact of sex-
segregated programs in K-12 public schools also initially led to this
Article's inclusion of the full breadth of the Supreme Court's equal
protection jurisprudence regarding sex-based classifications in its
constitutional analysis. Because K-12 public education differs in these
respects from the sex-segregated higher educational institutions at issue
in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan2 7 and United States v.
Virginia 28 it was necessary to look beyond these two cases to assess K-12
public single-sex education's constitutionality comprehensively. Despite
this initial, more limited goal, however, larger insights regarding the
parameters of the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence,
particularly its application of the intermediate scrutiny test, emerge from
this review. Most critically, the review suggests that the Court's
jurisprudence with regard to sex-based classifications is more consistent
than it may appear at first glance and that the intermediateness of the test
may come more from when the Court applies the test than from how the
Court applies the test.
Accordingly, Part II of this Article begins with a review of the Court's
jurisprudence regarding sex-based classifications, with a particular focus
on its application of the intermediate scrutiny test, which asks whether a
government is using a sex-based classification to achieve an "important"
government objective and whether the classification bears a "substantial
relationship" to that objective. Part III then considers the constitutionality
of sex-segregated K-12 public education in light of general principles
that can be drawn from this jurisprudential review. It first reviews the
history and context of current sex-segregated K-12 public education
programs, with a particular focus on comparing sex-segregated education
to reformed coeducation, not status quo coeducation. It then applies the
comprehensive analysis of Part II to sex-segregated K- 12 public education,
ultimately concluding that such programs are clearly unconstitutional
under the Supreme Court's thirty-year-plus line of equal protection cases
examining sex-discriminatory legislation. In light of this conclusion, it
recommends that the Department of Education rescind its 2006 regulations
26. LISE ELIOT, PINK BRAIN, BLUE BRAIN: How SMALL DIFFERENCES GROW INTO
TROUBLESOME GAPS-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABouT IT 304-06 (2009).
27. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
28. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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not only because they are themselves unconstitutional but also because
they are leading schools to develop unconstitutional programs that are
vulnerable to lawsuits.29
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE AND
ITS APPLICATION OF THE INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TEST
It took some years from the time the Court arguably first started
viewing sex classifications as suspect for it to announce the test that has
come to be known as the intermediate scrutiny test. 30 When Reed was
decided, the Court already used a strict scrutiny test for racial
classifications, in which a classification would only be upheld if it was
the least restrictive means by which to fulfill a compelling government
32interest. All other classifications were judged under the permissive
rational basis test.33
However, the Court did eventually make clear that laws that facially
treat men and women differently will be viewed suspiciously by the
Court and scrutinized carefully to make sure that they do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 34 In espousing the intermediate scrutiny approach,
the Court essentially adopted a test that, as its name indicates, is not as
strict as the test used in the case of racial classifications, but not as
permissive as the rational basis test.3 5  It is perhaps unsurprising that
such an in-between approach has been hard to apply, and, as noted above,
the Court's decisions in sex classification cases have accordingly been
widely criticized as unpredictable.36
One of the primary sites of debate, both within and outside the Court,
deals with whether intermediate scrutiny has evolved over the years to
look more similar to strict scrutiny or whether it is in fact no more strict
than rational basis scrutiny, a problem which some suggest is systemic
29. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b) (2011). Note that there are specific administrative
law procedures and issues related to rescinding or otherwise changing regulations in
circumstances such as these, but discussion of those specific procedures and issues are
outside the scope of this Article.
30. See Jason M. Skaggs, Comment, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action
Under United States v. Virginia's "Exceedingly Persuasive Justification" Standard, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1172-73 (1998).
31. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
32. Skaggs, supra note 30, at 1172.
33. Id.
34. Id
35. Id. at 1172-73.
36. See, e.g., id. at 1170; Wharton, supra note 16, at 1213.
37. See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 14, at 187 ("In reality, intermediate scrutiny in
gender cases is a form of rational basis review."); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 75 (1996) (arguing that "the Court did not
merely restate the intermediate scrutiny test but pressed it closer to strict scrutiny");
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to the Court's application of the test and others view as resulting from
misapplications of the test by particular Court majorities. Related to
this disagreement is a debate over whether the intermediate scrutiny test
requires comparing a sex-based classification's effectiveness in achieving
the particular government objective with sex-neutral alternatives for
achieving that objective.39  In the context of racial classifications, strict
scrutiny has necessitated such a comparison, requiring a racial
classification to constitute the "least restrictive means" by which a
government can achieve its objective in order to be upheld.4 0 However,
because the Court has not specified that a least restrictive means analysis
must be used in sex classification cases, some argue that intermediate
scrutiny is still not the same as strict scrutiny.4'
A close reading of the cases, 42 however, demonstrates that the different
perspectives involved in these debates may all be at least partially
correct and that the Court's equal protection jurisprudence on sex
classifications may be more consistent than it appears to be at first
Skaggs, supra note 30, at 1182-83 (concluding that gender-based classifications are
subject to a "more demanding standard of review than traditional intermediate scrutiny").
38. Deutsch, supra note 14, at 187. But see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74-97
(2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
39. See Deutsch, supra note 14, at 205-06.
40. Epstein et al., supra note 12, at 23.
41. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 954-56 (2002).
42. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam); Nguyen,
533 U.S. at 53; Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Heckler v.
Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion); Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980);
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979)
(plurality opinion); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977);
Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam), affg by an
equally divided Court 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976); Califano v. Silbowitz, 430 U.S. 924
(1977) (summary affirmance of district court decision declaring unconstitutional benefits
regime giving unequal insurance benefits to husbands and wives); Jablon v. Califano,
430 U.S. 924 (1977) (summary affirmance of district court decision declaring benefits
regime giving unequal spousal benefits to husbands and wives to be unconstitutional);
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975);
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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glance. Several insights emerge from this close reading. First, the cases
suggest that the appearance of inconsistency may come from the Court's
use of an unarticulated first step in its analysis, whereby the Court
decides whether a sex classification deals with circumstances in which
the sexes are similarly situated. If the sex classification deals with a
matter in which the Court views the sexes as not similarly situated, the
cases suggest that the Court never applies the test at all. However, if the
sex classification deals with a matter in which the sexes are similarly
situated, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny to that classification.
Moreover, once the Court decides to apply it, the intermediate scrutiny
test does in fact look a lot more like strict scrutiny, leading to a second
insight. That is, although the Court has not used the "least restrictive
means" magic language in its sex classification cases, in actuality, when
reviewing sex classifications, it does generally consider the availability
of sex-neutral alternatives that a government may use to achieve its
objective in lieu of the sex classification. The remainder of this Part
explains these insights, including elucidating in what circumstances the
Court considers the sexes to be similarly situated and demonstrating the
ways in which the Court's application of the intermediate scrutiny test,
once it has decided that the sexes are similarly situated, looks quite
similar to strict scrutiny, including with regard to the consideration of
sex-neutral alternatives.
A. The "Similarly Situated" Question
Reed marks the beginning of the shift in the Supreme Court's view on
sex classifications. In Reed, the Court overturned a statute that
automatically appointed men over women as estate administrators,
stating that this was as an "arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."A Beyond this
statement, however, it did not expound on its reasons for judging the
distinction to be arbitrary or for regarding it as violating the Equal
Protection Clause.
Over the next five years and until the Court finally established the
intermediate scrutiny test in Craig v. Boren,44 the Court decided six
more cases involving laws that made distinctions on the basis of sex
without clearly articulating that sex was a "suspect classification" deserving
more exacting scrutiny than the standard rational basis scrutiny.4 5
43. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
44. 429 U.S. at 197.
45. See Stanton, 421 U.S. at 13; Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 651-52; Schlesinger, 419
U.S. at 508-10; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494-97; Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355; Frontiero, 411
U.S. at 682, 688-90 (in which only a plurality supported the proposition that
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Nevertheless, despite the lack of a clear majority for "heightened
scrutiny" for sex-based classifications during these years, the Court
would establish during this period only three areas in which it would,
until the present day, be inclined to allow sex-based classifications: laws
46
implicating pregnancy and proof of parenthood, restrictions on women
serving in combat, 47 and compensation for past discrimination against
women. 48 In the first two categories, involving pregnancy and proof of
parenthood and combat, the Court majorities-or, in some cases,
pluralities-focused on a lack of similar situation between the sexes. 49
Pregnancy and proof of parenthood both involve biologically-based
reproductive roles in which men and women are not similarly situated,
and the combat restrictions on women were not challenged as sex
discriminatory and thus were accepted as a circumstance in which
women and men were also not similarly situated.50
The first case involving pregnancy, Geduldig v. Aiello, was decided in
1974 and upheld a statute that excluded pregnancy from the state's
disability insurance program.51 In that case, the Court characterized the
issue as "whether the California disability insurance program invidiously
discriminates against [pregnant women] and others similarly situated by
not paying insurance benefits for disability that accompanies normal
pregnancy and childbirth."S2 The Court then upheld the statute by
distinguishing an exclusion based on pregnancy from one based on sex. 3
The suggestion in Geduldig that pregnancy makes the sexes not
similarly situated is developed further in subsequent cases implicating
pregnancy and proof of parenthood, all of which were decided after
Craig adopted the intermediate scrutiny test. The first case implicating
proof of parenthood was Fiallo v. Bell, where the Court upheld a federal
statute giving special immigration status to the illegitimate children of
classifications based on sex are "inherently suspect" and should be "subjected to close
judicial scrutiny").
46. See, e.g., Parham, 441 U.S. at 354; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497.
47. See, e.g., Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508.
48. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280 (1979); Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 648.
49. See, e.g., Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508.
50. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (White, J., dissenting);
Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508.
51. 417 U.S. at 494.
52. Id at 492.
53. Id. at 497. Note that Congress overrode the decision in Geduldig when it
passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. See Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat.
2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).
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natural-citizen mothers, but not natural-citizen fathers.54 While basing
its decision primarily on separation of powers concerns, the Court did
note that Congress's decision to exclude unwed fathers could have been
due to "a concern with the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in
paternity determinations." The Court did not mention the intermediate
scrutiny test at all.
In a second case, Parham v. Hughes, a Court plurality upheld a statute
that required a father but not a mother of an illegitimate child to
legitimate that child legally in order to sue for the wrongful death of that
child.56 In so doing, four Justices reasoned that "mothers and fathers of
illegitimate children are not similarly situated. . . . Unlike the mother of
an illegitimate child whose identity will rarely be in doubt, the identity
of the father will frequently be unknown."57 Justice Powell, concurring
in the judgment, regarded the statute as meeting the intermediate
scrutiny test, but only stated that "the State's objective of avoiding difficult
problems of proof of paternity"5 was important and that the statute was
substantially related to it, without further explanation of how. In addition,
Justice Powell's statement that "[t]he marginally greater burden placed
upon fathers is no more severe than is required by the marked difference
between proving paternity and proving maternity-a difference we have
recognized repeatedly," 59 suggested that lack of similar situation between
mothers and fathers still factored into his analysis.
Another plurality opinion came along two years later in Michael M v.
Superior Court, where four Justices upheld a statute that prosecuted
boys but not girls under eighteen for statutory rape, ostensibly to prevent
teen pregnancy, 6 0 stating that "this Court has consistently upheld statutes
where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically
reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain
circumstances." 6 1 In concurrence, Justice Stewart stated that where "in
certain narrow circumstances men and women are not similarly situated[,]
. . . a gender classification based on clear differences between the sexes
is not invidious, and a legislative classification realistically based upon
those differences is not unconstitutional." 62 All five Justices devoted
54. 430 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1977).
55. Id. at 799.
56. 441 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1979) (plurality opinion).
57. Id at 355.
58. Id. at 361 (Powell, J., concurring).
59. Id at 360.
60. 450 U.S. 464, 472-73 (1981) (plurality opinion).
61. Id at 469.
62. Id. at 478 (Stewart, J., concurring). Of note, Justice Blackmun also concurred,
but most of his concurrence deals with drawing connections between statutory rape laws
and abortion laws. Id. at 481-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He also includes a portion
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most of their discussion to the importance of the government interest in
preventing teen pregnancy, but without doing a detailed analysis of how
a statutory rape prohibition was substantially related to such a goal.
An additional two years later, in Lehr v. Robertson, the Court upheld a
statute that required fathers but not mothers of illegitimate children to
register with the state in order to receive notice of adoption proceedings
involving such children.63 In an analysis comprising only five paragraphs,
the Court acknowledged that statutes involving such distinctions "may
not constitutionally be applied in that class of cases where the mother
and father are in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship
with the child," but held that where, as here, "one parent has an
established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has
... never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not
prevent a State from according the two parents different legal rights."6
Finally, in Nguyen v. INS, the Court upheld a federal statute giving
citizenship to illegitimate children born abroad of a foreign national
father and a U.S. citizen mother, but requiring U.S. citizen fathers of
illegitimate children to take various steps to legitimize the child before
the child could acquire citizenship.6 5 After explaining that the mother's
biological relationship to a child is verifiable from the birth itself but that
even a father's presence at a birth is not sufficient evidence of such a
relationship, the Court stated that "[fjathers and mothers are not similarly
situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood. The imposition
of a different set of rules for making that legal determination with
respect to fathers and mothers is neither surprising nor troublesome from
a constitutional perspective."66
Commentators sometimes refer to this line of cases under the moniker
of the "real differences doctrine."67 However, opinions vary as to what
of the victim's testimony in the criminal case, which suggests strongly that the victim
was forcibly raped but that the prosecution either did not pursue or unsuccessfully
pursued forcible rape charges because of inconsistencies in the victim's testimony and
other ways to question her credibility-she had been drinking, first kissed the assailant
willingly, and willingly kissed another boy also present during the same evening. Id. at
483 n.*.
63. 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983).
64. Id
65. 533 U.S. 53, 58-59 (2001).
66. Id. at 62-63.
67. Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 83, 90 (2009) (citing United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996)); Virginia F. Milstead, Forbidding Female Toplessness:
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the real differences doctrine means to the intermediate scrutiny test, with
some suggesting but not developing further the idea that the finding of a
real difference keeps the Court from applying intermediate scrutiny at
all, others not viewing the real differences doctrine as differentiating
these cases from other sex classification cases, 6 9 and still others suggesting
that the consideration of a real difference happens at some point in the
intermediate scrutiny test.7 0 It is worth noting that these commentators
also often criticize the real differences doctrine as a normative matter,
critiques with which this Author agrees but which are outside the scope
of this Article. More importantly, and perhaps as a result of this normative
critique, there are indications that the doctrine has always been unstable
and is becoming more so. In fact, one-third of the cases upholding sex
classification based on real differences were plurality opinions,72 and all
but one had at least three,73 but usually four strong dissenters.74 Many of
these dissents also protest a failure to apply or apply properly the
intermediate scrutiny test.75 Finally, a very recent case not discussed
above but which struck down a sex classification very similar to Nguyen
was affirmed per curiam by a divided Court because Justice Kagan did
not participate in it.7 6
Cases involving sex-based classifications related to the exclusion of
women from combat make up the second category of sex-based
classifications that the Court has consistently found to be permissible
under the Equal Protection Clause. Again, the reason advanced by the
Why "Real Difference" Jurisprudence Lacks "Support" and What Can Be Done About
It, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 273, 278 (2005); Wharton, supra note 16, at 1216.
68. Milstead, supra note 67, at 311; Wharton, supra note 16, at 1216.
69. Case, supra note 13, at 1457; Epstein et al., supra note 12, at 51.
70. Lindsey Sacher, Comment, From Stereotypes to Solid Ground: Reframing the
Equal Protection Intermediate Scrutiny Standard and Its Application to Gender-Based
College Admissions Policies, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1411, 1429-30 (2011).
71. See, e.g., Case, supra note 13, at 1457; Milstead, supra note 67, at 311;
Wharton, supra note 16, at 1217 (noting "wide" criticism of Geduldig and the formal
equality approach of the Court (citing KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 803 (15th ed. 2004))).
72. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion); Parham
v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (plurality opinion).
73. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 268 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Michael M.,
450 U.S. at 488 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Parham,
441 U.S. at 361 (White, J., dissenting).
75. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Michael M, 450 U.S. at
488 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Parham, 441 U.S. at 362 (White, J., dissenting); Geduldig,
417 U.S. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam), aff'g by an
equally divided Court 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
738
[VOL. 49: 725, 2012] Single-Sex and Reformed Coeducation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Court for allowing such distinctions is that the exclusion of women from
combat makes men and women not similarly situated when it comes to
military matters. Therefore, in Schlesinger v. Ballard, a case decided
prior to Craig's announcement of the intermediate scrutiny standard, the
Court allowed female naval officers a longer time in which to achieve
promotion than male officers, stating that "male and female line officers
in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for
professional service." 7 Following Craig, the Court continued to make
this distinction, upholding in Rostker v. Goldberg the governmental
requirement that men but not women register for a potential draft into
the military.
B. Application ofIntermediate Scrutiny
In cases where it judges women and men to be similarly situated, the
Supreme Court, arguably since Reed but certainly since Craig, has
consistently invalidated sex-based classifications by applying the
intermediate scrutiny test. Craig struck down a statute setting a lower
drinking age for "3.2% beer" for women than for men, articulating and
applying a test under which "classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."79 The Court in Craig expounded on
the application of this test in the following manner:
Reed .. . also provided the underpinning for decisions that have invalidated
statutes employing gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane
bases of classification. . . . In light of the weak congruence between gender
and the characteristic or trait that gender purported to represent, it was
necessary that the legislatures choose either to realign their substantive laws in
a gender-neutral fashion, or to adopt procedures for identifying those instances
where the sex-centered generalization actually comported with fact.
80
In this explanation, the Court made clear that it would look particularly
closely at the relationship between the sex distinction and the actual
achievement of the government's objective, including in comparison to
available sex-neutral alternatives. The state proffered empirical evidence on
the higher rates of young men involved in arrests for drunkenness, as
77. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
78. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78-79 (1981).
79. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
80. Id. at 198-99.
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well as arrests and traffic accidents relating to drunk driving.1 The Court
nevertheless stated that "prior cases have consistently rejected the use of
sex as a decisionmaking factor even though the statutes in question
certainly rested on far more predictive empirical relationships than this."82
It concluded that
proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and
one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies
the Equal Protection Clause. Suffice to say that the showing offered by
the [government] does not satisfy us that sex represents a legitimate, accurate
proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving.83
As the review below will show, post-Craig, in cases involving
classifications where men and women were viewed as similarly situated,
with a limited and unstable exception in affirmative action cases, the
intermediate scrutiny test has been applied consistently by the Court and
has regularly emphasized certain elements. It is this line of cases,
moreover, that supports the argument that the intermediate scrutiny test
operates more like strict scrutiny-it is perhaps even harder to satisfy
than strict scrutiny.84 Indeed, this review demonstrates that the Court's
81. Id. at 200-02.
82. Id. at 202.
83. Id. at 204.
84. Many commentators have argued that the intermediate scrutiny test actually
places more emphasis on determining whether the sex classification constitutes a
"stereotype" rather than applying the intermediate scrutiny test. See, e.g., Cohen, supra
note 10, at 180; Franklin, supra note 67, at 88; Hasday, supra note 10, at 760-61;
Jenkins, supra note 11, at 1986-87; Williams, Learning Differences, supra note 10, at
567; Sacher, supra note 70, at 1417. Most prominently, for instance, Professor Mary
Ann Case has argued that the Court requires that the sex classification be a "perfect
proxy" for the category of persons the government intends to affect. Case, supra note
13, at 1449. According to this argument, were the government to use some other method
besides sex to classify persons so as to achieve its stated objective, the sex classification
may not exclude even one woman or one man who should be included-making the
statute "underinclusive"-and it may not include even one woman or one man who
should be excluded-making the statute "overinclusive." See id. at 1449-50. As such,
Case argues that intermediate scrutiny can actually be more strict that strict scrutiny. Id.
at 1453. She also accounts for the non-similar-situation cases discussed above as cases
where the Court views the categories of pregnancy, proof of parenthood, and combat as
"perfect proxies." Id at 1457-58. However, Case and some Justices have pointed out
that pregnancy, proof of parenthood, and combat can be seen as susceptible to
stereotyping themselves. Id at 1458; see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 86-87
(2001) (O'Connor, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (identifying
differences in proof of parenthood for mothers and fathers as based on stereotype). This
adds support to the argument here that in the pregnancy, proof of parenthood, and
combat cases, the Court is in fact never applying any intermediate scrutiny analysis
because that analysis does not come into play when the sexes are not similarly situated.
In addition, the view of some Justices as to the potential for stereotyping in the areas of
pregnancy, proof of parenthood, and combat underscores the instability of the similarly
situated step in the Court's equal protection analysis.
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application of the test has been tough enough to mean that every
classification since Craig that did not involve pregnancy, proof of
parenthood, or participation in combat, with the single exception of
Califano v. Webster,85 an affirmative action case discussed in Part II.B.3
below, has been overturned by the Court. The remainder of this Part
will seek to elucidate how the intermediate scrutiny approach ends up
operating, outside of the non-similarly-situated cases, to lead to results
very similar to those in cases using strict scrutiny.
1. Important Government Interest
The "important government interest" prong seems, upon first
consideration, to be a fairly straightforward matter, with not much to
discuss without a particular government interest to assess, although some
commentators have indicated that the Court sometimes does its stereotyping
analysis during this part of the test.86 More critically, however, certain
procedural aspects of the test, rarely discussed in the literature, come
into play at the important government interest stage of the test. The first
procedural aspect of the test also applies to the substantial relationship
prong, which will be discussed in more detail below.
First, as Justice O'Connor has pointed out, in any case involving
heightened scrutiny, the burden of proving that the classification passes
the intermediate scrutiny test is on the government.8 7 This means that
the government must both produce an important interest that it is trying
to achieve and later prove that the sex classification actually achieves
that interest. This assignment of burden to the government gives any
challenge to a sex classification a procedural edge and means that the
government will always have a tougher road defending such a classification
than a challenger will have disputing it. As a result, this procedural rule
85. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
86. See, e.g., Sacher, supra note 70, at 1417-18.
87. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (indicating that the party seeking to uphold
a gender-based classification has the burden of showing a justification for the
classification); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (same); Wengler v.
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150-51 (1980) (stating that the party seeking to
uphold the statute carries the burden of proof, met only by showing that the classification
serves an important governmental objective and that the means are substantially related
to that objective).
741
is likely to push the intermediate scrutiny test more in the direction of
strict scrutiny.
Second, once a government does produce an important government
objective that its sex classification is designed to advance, the Court has
repeatedly stated that it will look closely at this objective to make sure it
is genuine and "not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to
litigation."88 This inquiry has flushed out many pretextual goals, including
in Virginia, where the Court found that Virginia had not excluded
women from the Virginia Military Institute to advance an overall plan of
providing single-sex educational options in the state as claimed.89
Similarly, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the Court looked at the legislative
history of the Social Security Act and found that the government's
objective for the challenged provision providing survivors' benefits to
widows but not widowers was not to compensate women for past
economic discrimination but to enable widows with minor children to
stay home even after their husbands died.90 Yet a third example can be
found in Califano v. Goldfarb, where both the plurality opinion of Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Powell and the concurrence of Justice
Stevens rejected the government's proffered reason of administrative
convenience for a provision that, in this case, paid all widows social
security benefits but only paid benefits to widowers who were dependent
on their deceased wives. 91 Finally, in Califano v. Westcott, the Court
rejected the reason given for legislation awarding unemployment benefits to
men but not women because "[t]here is little to suggest that the gender
qualification had anything to do with [the government's stated objective
of] reducing the father's incentive to desert." 92
2. Substantial Relationship
As suggested above, the bulk of the Court's test-and the toughest
aspect to satisfy--comes under the substantial relationship prong. The
Court's cases applying the test typically discuss one or more of three key
analyses as a part of the substantial relationship prong. These analyses
include the stereotyping examination already mentioned, an inquiry into
the empirical proof for the alleged relationship between the sex
88. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
89. Id. at 536.
90. 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
91. 430 U.S. 199, 209 n.8, 220 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
92. 443 U.S. 76, 88 (1979); see also Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728 (1982) (requiring a
"searching analysis" of the government's stated purpose for a sex-based classification);
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979) (rejecting administrative convenience rationale as
an important government interest).
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classification and the government objective, and a consideration of
what alternative methods the government could have used to achieve its
objectives.
a. Stereotyping
The Court has referred to stereotyping in various ways over the four
decades since Reed: "archaic and overbroad generalizations,"93 "increasingly
outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home
rather than in the 'marketplace and world of ideas, '94 "old notions, "
"stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for
special protection," 96 "fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females," 9 7 "traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about
the proper roles of men and women," 98 and "group stereotypes rooted in,
and reflective of, historical prejudice." 99 Although some observe that
the Court will occasionally begin the stereotyping analysis when
discussing the government interest,'00 most of the characterizations listed
here demonstrate the way in which the Court's stereotyping analysis fits
into the substantial relationship prong of the intermediate scrutiny test.101
They indicate that the Court is looking at the fit between the
classification and the government objective to see whether the
generalization about men and women embodied in the sex classification
precisely and accurately advances the achievement of the government's
goal. 10 2 If the generalization is "overbroad," it will not fit the reality of
female and male characteristics, roles, and lives, and then it will not
93. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975); see also Virginia, 518 U.S.
at 533 ("overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences
of males and females"); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) ("overbroad
generalizations"); Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 211 (quoting Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (same).
94. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15
(1975)).
95. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 211 (quoting Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
96. - Orr, 440 U.S. at 283.
97. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
98. Id. at 726.
99. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994).
100. Sacher, supra note 70, at 1417-18.
101. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
102. See, e.g., id.
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advance the objective in the way intended.o3 In addition, if the
generalization draws from old or fixed notions, traditional assumptions,
outdated misconceptions, or historical bias, it is unlikely to fit current
reality, especially in a societal context of rapid change in sex and gender
roles, which has been true in the United. States since at least 1971, the
year of Reed, and arguably since well before then.10 4
b. Empirical Proof
The Court's view on stereotypes also demonstrates the role that
empirical proof plays in determining whether a particular sex-based
classification violates equal protection. Although the Court will consider
empirical evidence, as early as Craig the Court expressed skepticism
about the usefulness of empirical studies. 05  In addition, it has repeatedly
made clear that "gender classifications that rest on impermissible
stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some
statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization."' 0 6  The
concern here appears to relate to what the Court has referred to as "self-
fulfilling prophec[ies]."o? For instance, in pointing out why Mississippi
103. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (stating that the Navy's
different treatment of male and female naval officers did not reflect an impermissibly
overbroad generalization).
104. See, e.g., Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14-15.
105. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) ("[P]roving broad sociological
propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with
the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause.").
106. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994); see also
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980) ("It may be that there
is empirical support for the proposition that men are more likely to be the principal
supporters of their spouses and families, but the bare assertion of this argument falls far
short of justifying gender-based discrimination on the grounds of administrative
convenience." (citation omitted)); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206 (1977);
Craig, 429 U.S. at 202 ("[P]rior cases have consistently rejected the use of sex as a
decisionmaking factor even though the statutes in question certainly rested on far more
predictive empirical relationships than this."); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
645 (1975) ("Obviously, the notion that men are more likely than women to be the
primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without empirical
support. But such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration
of the efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their
families' support." (citation omitted)).
107. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982); see also United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542-43 (1996) ("The notion that admission of women
would downgrade VMI's stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the
school, is a judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other 'self-
fulfilling prophec[ies],' once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities." (footnotes
and citation omitted)); Craig, 429 U.S. at 202 n.14 ("The very social stereotypes that
find reflection in age-differential laws are likely substantially to distort the accuracy of
these comparative statistics. Hence 'reckless' young men who drink and drive are
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University for Women's all-female nursing program did not meet the
equal protection standard, the Court explained:
Rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers faced by women, MUW's
policy of excluding males from admission .. . tends to perpetuate the stereotyped
view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job. By assuring that [MUW]
allots more openings in its state-supported nursing schools to women than it
does to men, MUW's admissions policy lends credibility to the old view that
women, not men, should become nurses, and makes the assumption that
nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy.' 08
In retaining skepticism regarding empirical studies, the Court has
recognized that although "a shred of truth may be contained in some
stereotypes, [the Equal Protection Clause] requires that state actors look
beyond the surface before making judgments about people that are likely
to stigmatize as well as to perpetuate historical patterns of
discrimination."10
c. Availability ofSex-Neutral Alternatives
The Court's skeptical attitude toward empirical data in turn relates to
the last hallmark of the substantial relationship prong, which considers
the availability of sex-neutral means to accomplish the government's
objective. Although the Court has never explicitly used a least restrictive
means analysis as it has done in strict scrutiny cases, in its cases
applying intermediate scrutiny since Craig, when sex-neutral means
have been available to achieve a government's objective, the Court has
overturned the use of the sex-based classification. Perhaps the clearest
statement of this principle came in the opinion of the Court in Orr v.
Orr, where the Court invalidated an Alabama law that required husbands
but not wives to pay alimony. 110 The Court found two possible objectives
for the law, assistance to needy spouses and compensation to women for
past discrimination, but found that the state was already conducting sex-
neutral, individualized hearings to determine neediness between the
spouses."' Therefore, the Court concluded that Alabama's own behavior
acknowledged that "[w]here, as here, the State's compensatory and
transformed into arrest statistics, whereas their female counterparts are chivalrously
escorted home." (citation omitted)).
108. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-30.
109. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 139 n.11.
110. 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
111. Id. at 280-81.
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ameliorative purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral classification
as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of
sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis
of sex." 1l2
Although not every case provides as clear a statement of it as Orr did,
the Court has nevertheless acted upon this principle several times. In
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., for instance, the Court rejected
a sex classification that denied widowers death benefits under the state's
workers' compensation law, but acknowledged the importance of the
state's interest in providing for needy spouses.113 It noted, nevertheless,
that
[slurely the needs of surviving widows and widowers would be completely
served either by paying benefits to all members of both classes or by paying
benefits only to those members of either class who can demonstrate their need.
Why, then, employ the discriminatory means of paying all surviving widows
without requiring proof of dependency, but paying only those widowers who
make the required demonstration? 14
In addition, several cases involving the relative rights of the fathers and
mothers of illegitimate children or the illegitimate children's rights
vis-d-vis their mothers and fathers-even those that have ostensibly
used rational basis scrutiny-have discussed the need for states to ensure
that "the statute 'is carefully tuned to alternative considerations."" 15
Finally, in seven of the eleven cases where the Court upheld a statute as
not violating equal protection, there was a dissent of two to four Justices
arguing that the intermediate scrutiny test should have been applied or
had not been applied properly.1 16 In applying the test to the facts, these
112. Id at 283; see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652-53 (1975)
("[T]o the extent that Congress legislated on the presumption that women as a group
would choose to forgo work to care for children while men would not, the statutory
structure, independent of the gender-based classification, would deny or reduce benefits
to those men who conform to the presumed norm and are not hampered by their child-
care responsibilities.... Thus, the gender-based distinction is gratuitous; without it, the
statutory scheme would only provide benefits to those men who are in fact similarly
situated to the women the statute aids." (footnote omitted)).
113. 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980).
114. Id. at 151.
115. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977); see also Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979) (invalidating a law that allowed unwed mothers but not fathers
to block the adoption of their children by withholding consent, stating "[w]hen the
adoption of an older child is sought, the State's interest in proceeding with adoption
cases can be protected by means that do not draw such an inflexible gender-based
distinction as that made in § 111").
116. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (O'Connor, J., joined by Souter,
Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("In a long line of cases spanning nearly three
decades, this Court has applied heightened scrutiny to legislative classifications based on
sex."); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 87 (1981) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
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dissents all discuss the significance of the availability of sex-neutral
alternatives in reaching their conclusions that the statutes violated the
Equal Protection Clause.'
dissenting) (identifying the necessary level of scrutiny as "heightened"); Michael M. v.
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 488 (1981) (Brennan, J., joined by White & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting) (referring to the necessary level of scrutiny as "mid-level"); Pers. Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 282 (1979) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting)
(applying intermediate scrutiny test to find statutory scheme unconstitutional);
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 361 n.2 (1979) (White, J., joined by Brennan,
Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the majority did not subject the
upheld statute to "an appropriate level of scrutiny"); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
498 (1974) (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (stating that the
Court's precedents "mandate a stricter standard of scrutiny" than that applied by the
majority); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the upheld statute should have been "subjected to close
judicial scrutiny").
117. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 78 (O'Connor, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer,
JJ., dissenting) ("[W]e require a much tighter fit between means and ends under
heightened scrutiny, the availability of sex-neutral alternatives to a sex-based
classification is often highly probative of the validity of the classification."); Rostker,
453 U.S. at 94 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Under our precedents,
the Government cannot meet this burden without showing that a gender-neutral statute
would be a less effective means of attaining this end."); Michael M, 450 U.S. at 491
(Brennan, J., joined by White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("California still has the
burden of proving that there are fewer teenage pregnancies under its gender-based
statutory rape law than there would be if the law were gender neutral."); Feeney, 442
U.S. at 285 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Particularly when viewed
against the range of less discriminatory alternatives available to assist veterans,
Massachusetts' choice of a formula that so severely restricts public employment
opportunities for women cannot reasonably be thought gender-neutral." (footnote
omitted)); Parham, 441 U.S. at 364-65 (White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (pointing out that requiring unwed fathers but not unwed
mothers to have legitimated a child prior to that child's death in order to sue for a child's
wrongful death is a more drastic measure than "merely a rule concerning the competency
of evidence" to protect against spurious tort litigation claims); Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 505
(Brennan, J., joined by Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("California's legitimate
interest in fiscal integrity could easily have been achieved through a variety of less
drastic, sexually neutral means."); Kahn, 416 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I think that the statute is invalid because the State's interest
can be served equally well by a more narrowly drafted statute."). Of the remaining four
cases, one, Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), was per curiam, one was the
nonsubstantive decision of Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984), and in the last two
the dissent never reached the substantial relationship prong because it viewed the
government objective as illegitimate in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), and
would have overturned the statute on non-equal-protection grounds in Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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3. Constitutionality of Sex Classifications Designed To
Compensate for Past Discrimination
The only circumstance in which the Court has upheld a statute using
sex-based distinctions after applying intermediate scrutiny has been
when those distinctions clearly were designed to compensate women for
past discrimination. However, of the three cases where a compensatory
purpose was involved, intermediate scrutiny was only straightforwardly
applied in one, Califano v. Webster, where the Court solidly upheld a
compensatory, affirmative action-type classification."'8 Schlesinger was
upheld as compensatory, but the more important issue influencing the
Court in Schlesinger may have been the combat exclusion basis mentioned
above."' 9 The only other case involving a compensatory motive was
Kahn v. Shevin, which was decided before Craig and included language
that the distinction in Kahn had "a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation," suggesting that the Court was applying rational
basis scrutiny.120 It is therefore not as certain that the legislation at issue
in Kahn would have been upheld post-Craig.
Moreover, Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the use of
intermediate versus strict scrutiny in the affirmative action context may
indicate that even benign sex classifications will now have a tougher
time satisfying the Court. First, the Court has rejected the use of a
different standard of scrutiny for benign race classifications,'21 and this
creates the question of whether benign sex classifications would be
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny, as are all sex classifications, or
under strict scrutiny as a benign classification.12 2 Second, some Justices
have indicated that, in their opinion, benign classifications would not
meet intermediate scrutiny either. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, a
dissent by Justices who would later be a part of the majority that applied
strict scrutiny to benign racial classifications speculated that the FCC's
affirmative action program "cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny
because race-neutral and untried means of directly accomplishing the
governmental interest are readily available.' 23 Besides indicating that
the Court's view on sex classifications that seek to compensate women
for past discrimination has changed since Webster, this last quote also
118. 430 U.S. at 316-18.
119. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
120. Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995).
122. Skaggs, supra note 30, at 1170-71.
123. 497 U.S. 547, 622 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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provides more evidence of the relevance under intermediate scrutiny of
the availability of sex-neutral alternatives.
In sum, when the Court is faced with a sex classification, in reality
there is significantly more to its analysis than is acknowledged by the
doctrinal description that the Court examines whether the classification
is "substantially related to an important government objective."l24 First,
the Court will consider whether the sex classification classifies the sexes
as to a trait in which they are similarly situated. Only when it finds
similar situation will the Court apply the intermediate scrutiny test. Second,
once the intermediate scrutiny test is triggered, it operates in such a
fashion as to create results similar to those generated by strict scrutiny:
overwhelming invalidation of sex classifications as violating the Equal
Protection Clause. Specifically, because the government bears the burden
of proof, it must produce and show that it has a genuine, important
objective and must show that the sex classification closely fits the
achievement of that objective. In its demonstration of fit, moreover, the
government must demonstrate that the classification does not constitute
a sex stereotype, regardless of whether that stereotype can be supported
by empirical proof showing that most women or most men act in
accordance with the stereotype. The government must also show that the
sex classification is more effective than existing sex-neutral alternatives
in advancing the government's objective. Finally, the evidence that sex
classifications with a compensatory purpose would pass constitutional
muster under intermediate scrutiny today is shaky and likely will not
exempt the classification from being compared to available sex-neutral
alternatives.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEX-SEGREGATED K-12 PUBLIC
EDUCATION GENERALLY AND THE 2006 DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION REGULATIONS SPECIFICALLY
While nothing is an absolute certainty in Supreme Court litigation,
when the more comprehensive approach articulated above is applied to
it, sex-segregated K-12 public education seems destined to be judged
unconstitutional. Therefore, the regulations passed in 2006 by the
Department of Education (ED) are themselves challengeable.12 5
124. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137 n.6 (1994) (citing Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982)).
125. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b) (2011).
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Accordingly, this Part will analyze public K-12 single-sex programs in
general, but with an emphasis on the 2006 regulations and programs that
have arguably been encouraged by the regulations, including those at
issue in the Vermilion Parish case1 2 6 and in another case challenging a
public K-12 sex-segregation initiative, ANA. ex rel. S.F.A. v. Breckinridge
County Board of Education,127 both of which are discussed in greater
detail below. This emphasis on contemporary sex-segregated programs
is generated not only by their links to the 2006 regulations but also by
the context in which many of these programs have been formed. This
context includes several decades of criticism of K-12 public coeducation
for failing to educate girls and boys equitably, a movement to promote
public educational "choice," and a recent fad in popular books and
commentary regarding research on male and female brains. These factors
have converged to cause an increase in the promotion of sex-segregated
education as a solution to the inequities and other problems of
coeducation and the current public educational system more generally.
As already mentioned, the typical comparison assumed by the literature
on sex-segregated education compares sex-segregated education with the
coeducational status quo. Missing from this assessment, therefore, is
whether creating sex-segregated programs or reforming coeducation will
go further to improve educational outcomes for girls and boys. Yet it is
this comparison-between the effectiveness of sex-segregated education
and reformed coeducation-that is the critical one, not only as a policy
matter but also in terms of the constitutional test that sex-segregated
programs will have to pass. Therefore, this Part first explains the context of
the current sex-segregated educational initiatives, with particular focus
on the proper-and constitutionally required-comparison between sex-
segregated education and reformed coeducation, then applies the
Supreme Court's sex classifications equal protection jurisprudence to
current K-12 public sex-segregated education generally and the 2006
regulations specifically. As the application of the intermediate scrutiny
test will show, comparing sex-segregated education to reformed
coeducation, rather than comparing sex-segregated education and the
coeducational status quo, demonstrates that K-12 sex-segregated public
education is clearly unconstitutional.
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126. Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 F. App'x 366 (5th Cir. 2011).
127. A.N.A. ex rel. S.F.A. v. Breckinridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 833 F. Supp. 2d 673
(W.D. Ky. 2011).
[VOL. 49: 725, 2012] Single-Sex and Reformed Coeducation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
A. Comparing Sex-Segregated Education, Status Quo
Coeducation, and Reformed Coeducation
1. The Coeducational Status Quo
Exactly what is the coeducational status quo? As with anything, the
answer depends in part on what one stresses. With regard to the sex-
segregated education debate, the stress is on whether coeducation treats
male and female students equitably and on the relative educational
achievements of girls and boys.'28 Both strands are concerned to a greater
or lesser extent not only with what children experience in schools but
also how those experiences feed into their lives as adults. Concerns
about first girls' then boys' achievements and experiences in schools
have sometimes been termed the "girls' crisis" and the "boys' crisis" in
education.129
Extensive studies have been published regarding girls' and boys'
experiences in school. These accounts have documented a number of
difficulties that girls face in school, including experiencing a drop in
their standardized test scores relative to boys between the early grades
and high school, 30 feeling less positive and confident in math and
science, 131 and receiving less teacher time and attention, both in terms of
quantity and quality.' 32 In addition to specifically educational problems,
girls face other significant problems that impact their ability to stay and
succeed in school, including teen pregnancy, eating disorders, sexual
harassment, and a drop in self-esteem-problems that are worse for
minority girls, and are a part of the cycle of poverty that makes women
the poorest of the poor.133
128. Note that consideration of such assessments should keep in mind that their
relative quality can give the inaccurate impression that education is a boys-against-the-
girls "zero-sum" game. Remembering that the weaknesses of girls can be the strengths
of boys-and vice versa-can help avoid such an inference.
129. See Elizabeth Weil, Teaching to the Testosterone, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 2,
2008, at 38, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/magazine/02sex3-t.html?
pagewanted=all.
130. DAVID SADKER ET AL., STILL FAILING AT FAIRNESS: How GENDER BIAS CHEATS
GIRLS AND Boys IN SCHOOL AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 24 (Scribner ed. 2009).
131. Id. at 124.
132. Id. at 24.
133. See id.; id. at 161-62 ("[Albout one-third of teenage girls will become
pregnant at least once by age twenty. . . . When girls leave [school], they rarely return to
earn their high school diploma or general equivalency diploma (GED)."); see also
PEGGY ORENSTEIN, SCHOOLGIRLS: YOUNG WOMEN, SELF-ESTEEM, AND THE CONFIDENCE
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Boys also have a serious list of educational difficulties relative to
girls, including lower grades throughout school, 13 4 lack of interest and
achievement in writing and reading, 13 5 and lower percentages both going
to and graduating from college.136 As with girls, boys also experience
nonacademic problems that affect their academic performance. They are
more likely than girls to be sent to school psychologists;1 37 to be diagnosed
as hyperactive, autistic, and emotionally disturbed, but underdiagnosed
for depression;.3 . to face discipline for misbehavior, 139 especially if they
are boys of color;140 to manifest violent behavior; 14 1 to get involved in
crime and arrests and engage in risk-taking behaviors that lead to a high
rate of accidental deaths; 142 and to commit suicide and homicide. 143
GAP 199 (1994) ("Latina girls . . . are twice as likely as white girls to become teenage
mothers." (citing SONIA M. PEREZ ET AL., NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, REDUCING
HISPANIC TEENAGE PREGNANCY AND FAMILY POVERTY: A REPLICATION GUIDE 9 (1992)));
MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: How AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
CHEAT GIRLS 116 (1994) (stating that across the board, "[e]conomic and educational
poverty set the stage for adolescent pregnancy"); SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 143
(explaining that 90% of Americans with anorexia and bulimia are women between the
ages of twelve and twenty-five, that 42% of "first- to third-grade girls want to be thinner,
and 81 percent of ten-year-olds are afraid of being fat"). In 2001, the American
Association of University Women (AAUW) reported that 81% of girls and 79% of boys
reported experiencing some type of unwanted sexual behavior in school and that 65% of
girls and 42% of boys said they had been touched in a sexual way. SADKER ET AL., supra
note 130, at 156 (citing AM. Ass'N OF UNIv. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS:
BULLYING, TEASING, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL 20-21 (2001)). Between the
ages of nine and fifteen, the self-esteem of girls drops 38% for Latinas, 33% for white
girls, and 7% for black girls. ORENSTEIN, supra, at xxi-xxii. Although black girls retain
their overall self-esteem more than other girls, they are more pessimistic about their
teachers and school than other girls. Id. Further,
[e]conomic penalties follow women after graduation. Careers that have a high
percentage of female workers, such as teaching and nursing, are poorly paid.
And even when women work in the same jobs as men, they earn less money.
Most of America's poor live in households that are headed by women.
SADKER & SADKER, supra, at 14.
134. SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 126.
135. Id.
136. Levit, supra note 10, at 472.
137. SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 126.
138. Id
139. SADKER & SADKER, supra note 133, at 220-21.
140. Levit, supra note 10, at 470.
141. See ELIOT, supra note 26, at 3.
142. Id. at 280 ("Boys are 73 percent more likely than girls are to die from accidents
between birth and age fourteen. Males of all ages are more likely than girls to get
stitched up in the ER, drown, or die in a car accident or ATV crash. They also break
more rules. Boys are likelier than girls to cheat on exams, get expelled from school,
drive drunk, and sell drugs. As adults, men are arrested at least four times as often as
women are for every crime (except prostitution).").
143. Id. at 3, 264.
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The same and similar sources suggest that the most significant of the
causes for these inequities are those linked to gender socialization, either
through the gendered messages children receive from adults or the gendered
behaviors of peers. Identified as the "hidden curriculum," these are
elements of "the running subtext through which teachers communicate
behavioral norms and individual status in the school culture, the process
of socialization that cues children into their place in the hierarchy of
larger society."1 44 A typical example of the hidden curriculum can be
seen when examining the puzzling fact that although girls score behind
boys on standardized tests, they get better grades. 145 Educational equity
scholars Karen Zittleman and Myra and David Sadker have reviewed
research that suggests that girls get better grades because teachers give
them "good grade[s] for good behavior."l 4 6 In this way, educators "teach
girls to value silence and compliance, to view those qualities as a virtue."l 47
Girls learn these lessons well because when they get less attention from
teachers or face other inequities they are more likely to resist passively
by "opting out rather.than acting out."' 48 African-American girls, who
tend to resist the passivity lessons of the hidden curriculum and participate
and seek attention in class, are the most frequently rebuffed in their
attempts to initiate contact with teachers 49 and are the least likely to
receive clear academic feedback.so These "microinequities" translate into
substantially unequal education."' This may be because greater attention
from teachers translates into greater learning,'5 2 because girls' learning
problems or "gifted" statuses are not noticed and they do not get the
special attention they need, 5 3 or because they are stigmatized and pushed
out of the system for resisting the lessons of the hidden curriculum.1 54
Although the hidden curriculum first received attention in the context
of its harms to girls, those studying boys, men, and educational equity
144. ORENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 176.
146. Id. at 196.
147. ORENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 35.
148. Id. at 81.
149. Id. at 180.
150. SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 73.
151. Levit, supra note 10, at 464 (quoting ROBERTA M. HALL & BERNICE R.
SANDLER, Assoc. OF AM. COLLS., THE CLASSROOM CLIMATE: A CHILLY ONE FOR
WOMEN? 5, 7-9 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. SADKER& SADKER, supra note 133, at 43-44, 55.
153. ORENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 36.
154. Id. at 36, 181.
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increasingly attribute boys' educational problems to rigid, outdated, and
damaging masculinity lessons. A recent and comprehensive discussion
of masculinity and single-sex education by Professor David S. Cohen,
for instance, discusses "essentialized" and "hegemonic" masculinity as
the dominant form of masculinity used in many discussions about educating
boys.' 55  This essentialized masculinity says that boys are naturally
heterosexual, aggressive, active, sports-obsessed, competitive, stoic, and,
most importantly, not girls.'56 Cohen's research reflects older research
that is consistent with this definition. 157
Cohen also reviews the harms that come to boys from this dominant
definition of masculinity. He divides those harms into two general areas:
harm to boys who do not fit the definition" 8 and constraints on all boys
because it is "virtually impossible for any one boy to always live
consistently with [the ideal of masculinity asserted by this definition]."' 59
In terms of specific harms, Cohen mentions both general losses in self-
esteem that can come from the inability of any boy to meet this standard
and the particular abuse that can be directed at some boys, especially
those perceived as feminine or homosexual, or those with disabilities
who are limited in their pursuits of sports and other activities that rely on
physical activity, competitiveness, and aggression.16 0 Others have drawn
even more direct lines between traditional masculinity and violence,
suppression of emotion, risk-taking behaviors, and substance abuse.161
Despite these harms, there is less critique of how the hidden curriculum
socializes boys into traditionally masculine behaviors. Adults are more
155. Cohen, supra note 10, at 153-54.
156. Id.; see also SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 125-26.
157. Other authors have noted that the most insulting thing a boy can be called is
"girl," "woman," "sissy," or "fag." See ORENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 116; SADKER ET
AL., supra note 130, at 127; Barrie Thorne, Girls and Boys Together ... But Mostly
Apart: Gender Arrangements in Elementary School, in MEN'S LivES 87, 94 (Michael S.
Kimmel & Michael A. Messner eds., 4th ed. 1998). Authors also note that traditional
masculinity is constructed by differentiating it from femininity-"girl"-and feminized
men, namely homosexuals, "sissies," or "fags." See Michael S. Kimmel, Rethinking
"Masculinity": New Directions in Research, in CHANGING MEN: NEw DIRECTIONS IN
RESEARCH ON MEN AND MASCULINITY 9, 16 (Michael S. Kimmel ed., 1987). Additionally,
they note boys' constant competition for the spotlight and star status and that being a
"winner" is a core trait of the male sex-role stereotype. See SADKER & SADKER, supra
note 133, at 210-13.
158. Cohen, supra note 10, at 170-71.
159. Id. at 173.
160. Id. at 170-72.
161. See generally Michael Kimmel, Men, Masculinity, and the Rape Culture, in
TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE 139 (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., rev. ed. 2005);
Michael A. Messner, The Triad of Violence in Men 's Sports, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE
CULTURE, supra, at 23.
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anxious when boys engage in cross-sex behavior than when girls do.' 62
Where children's books have shifted their characterizations of women's
roles, there have been few comparable moves to show men in more
nurturing and caring behaviors. 63 When masculinity and education is
discussed, discussion focuses on and anxiously disapproves of the
"feminization of education" and the assumed detrimental effects such a
feminization will have on boys,' 6 4 reinforcing the boundaries of traditional
masculinity in the typical oppositional, hierarchical structure, with
masculine behaviors at the top and feminine behaviors at the bottom. As
a result, few seem to notice the links between boys' concerns about their
place in these gendered hierarchies and some of the educational difficulties
boys face. For example, "boys often regard reading and writing as
'feminine' subjects that threaten their masculinity" and accordingly
"perform below females in writing and reading achievement."' 65 Similarly,
discussions about youth and violence are mainly silent about the part
masculinity plays in teaching boys about the acceptability-indeed, the
admirable qualities-of violence,' 6 6 yet many of the problems boys face
are related to their involvement in violence, crime, and risk-taking
activities bordering on violence.' 6 7
Finally, it is worth noting that many of the harms of the hidden
curriculum to boys are also linked to harm to girls. For instance,
consider sexual harassment, which occurs at disturbingly high levels in
schools,168 is mainly directed at girls,16 9 and when directed at boys is
directed at those who are perceived as feminine or homosexual. 70 The
insights of Cohen and others point out that traditional masculinity "relies
162. SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 127-28.
163. MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, THE GENDERED SOCIETY 156 (2000); see also SADKER ET
AL., supra note 130, at 22 (comparing the gender roles presented in two popular
children's titles from 2008).
164. SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 200; Cohen, supra note 10, at 168.
165. SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 126.
166. KIMMEL, supra note 163, at 10.
167. ELIOT, supra note 26, at 180.
168. See AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., supra note 133; CATHERINE
HILL & HOLLY KEARL, AM. Ass'N OF UNIv. WOMEN, CROSSING THE LINE: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AT SCHOOL (2011); see also Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Campus Violence:
Understanding the Extraordinary Through the Ordinary, 35 J.C. & U.L. 613, 616-17
(2009) (describing the prevalence of sexual assault among college students).
169. HILL & KEARL, supra note 168, at 2.
170. See Cantalupo, supra note 168, at 688; see also SADKER ET AL., supra note
130, at 129 ("The most likely targets [of bullying] are gay students, or students perceived
as gay.").
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on societal domination of women by men" and "can lead to emotional
and physical harassment of and violence against girls" because "[t]he
notion of femininity as the opposite of desirable hegemonic masculinity
... leads to a conception that to be a boy means to dominate and control
female bodies."l 7 1 Thus, not only can a hidden curriculum in traditional
masculinity harm boys, but it can also be linked to a prominent inhibitor
of girls' academic success.172
2. Reformed Coeducation
Although the previous review gives a sense of what kinds of problems
have been documented with regard to coeducation, it does not discuss
what efforts have been made, if any, to reform coeducation in light of
these critiques, nor does it discuss how successful any attempted reforms
have been. Yet educational literature abounds with an amazing list of
techniques teachers, administrators, and parents can and do use to intervene
in the lessons of the gendered hidden curriculum, in addition to providing
much evidence that such techniques are being used successfully in
schools and classrooms across the country.
Indeed, the information generated greatly exceeds the scope of this
Article. A sampling of techniques, however, shows them organized around
several themes. These include techniques to balance positive and negative
teacher attention to students and standards of conduct for all students in
a class; 73 confronting bias and including women in curricular materials,
classroom decorations, displays, examples, and illustrations;174 giving
feedback and guidance commonly given to boys to all children, including
explicit instructions on how to complete assignments for themselves,
encouragement to work hard, and attribution of error to lack of effort,
171. Cohen, supra note 10, at 172. These points have also been corroborated by
others whose research concludes that differentiating themselves from anything feminine
means that boys suppress emotions and learn to devalue girls, which can cause
explosions of violence that are often directed at girls and women. SADKER & SADKER,
supra note 133, at 205-09. There is also evidence from cases of rampage school
shootings that the inability of some boys-in those cases, the shooters-to live up to the
traditional masculine "ideal," as well as the resulting harassment to which they may fall
victim, could lead them to try and assert their masculinity in devastating ways that are
often directed mainly at women or girls. Cantalupo, supra note 168, at 622.
172. See infra notes 224, 228-29 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., ORENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 30, 245.
174. See, e.g., id. at 145-46; SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 99, 174, 305
(encouraging parents and educators to incorporate "females and males from diverse
racial and ethnic groups" into classroom displays, introduce biographies of individuals
who broke gender barriers in their fields, or promote reading about accomplished
women); Karen J. Warren, Rewriting the Future: The Feminist Challenge to the
Malestream Curriculum, in THE FEMINIST TEACHER ANTHOLOGY: PEDAGOGIES AND
CLASSROOM STRATEGIES 45, 52 (Gail E. Cohee et al. eds., 1998).
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not lack of ability;'" providing connections with the community;176 and
leveling with students about the hidden curriculum, including home,
family, and relationship issues,177 bias in curricular materials,'17 sexuality,1 7 9
classroom dynamics, 8 0 and masculinity and femininity.s Still other
techniques include assigning and not leaving to peer dynamics the choice of
classroom toys, equipment, research topics, and group roles;182 Using
cooperative group learning techniques and "interest enhancers" that build
skills; 18 3 and working to desegregate the widespread sex segregation in
175. SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 111.
176. Evidence suggests that this technique can particularly benefit girls of color.
See ORENSTEIN, supra note 133, at xxi ("The AAUW survey revealed that ... far more
African American girls retain their overall self-esteem during adolescence than white or
Latina girls, maintaining a stronger sense of both personal and familial importance. . . .
The one exception .. . is their feelings about school . . . ." (citing AM. Ass'N OF UNIV.
WOMEN, SHORTCHANGING GIRLS, SHORTCHANGING AMERICA: FULL DATA REPORT 19, 28
(1991))). These higher levels of self-esteem may be historical, in that "the model of
European femininity-grounded . . . in . . . idealized helplessness-has largely been
unavailable to black women. Instead, they have measured their worth through strength
of character and a tenacious sense of self." Id. at 159 (citing Mary Burgher, Images of
Self and Race in the Autobiographies of Black Women, in STURDY BLACK BRIDGES:
VIsIoNS OF BLACK WOMEN IN LITERATURE 107, 107-22 (Roseann P. Bell et al. eds.,
1979)). However, this self-esteem does not transfer to the school context because of
what "some researchers [posit as] a vision of a dual self-esteem," positive at home but
negative and stigmatized at school. Id. at 160. Latina girls in the AAUW survey, on the
other hand, have the largest drops in self-esteem, id. at xxi, 218 (citing generally AM.
Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra), attributed by one commentator to their invisibility and
lack of knowledge about the positive aspects of their culture. SADKER ET AL., supra note
130, at 108-09.
177. SADKER & SADKER, supra note 133, at 223-25.
178. SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 100.
179. ORENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 246.
180. Id. at 27; SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 307-08.
181. SADKER & SADKER, supra note 133, at 228.
182. R.W. Connell, Disruptions: Improper Masculinities and Schooling, in MEN'S
LIVES, supra note 157, at 141, 151-52; see also ELIOT, supra note 26, at 137-38.
Smaller groups are more conducive to all students talking freely. JOYCE S. KASER ET AL.,
GUIDE FOR SEx EQUITY TRAINERS 72 (1982). This is especially true when small groups
are governed by rules that rotate individual roles and explain to students that all students
should get to lead. SADKER & SADKER, supra note 133, at 270-73. When students also
teach each other, it leads to achievement and promotes diverse friendships. Id. at 270.
Finally, games such as chess and puzzles and experimentation at home can humanize
math and science to girls and teach alternatives to brute strength and size, such as
communication, patience, calmness, and focus, to boys. Id. at 123, 223-24.
183. SADKER & SADKER, supra note 133, at 123-24; see also SADKER ET AL., supra
note 130, at 210 (suggesting gender-collaborative group learning techniques).
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coeducational settings that can exacerbate the inequities between boys
and girls.184
These techniques are in no way theoretical. From various reports,
techniques as diverse as waiting an extra few seconds instead of calling
on the first student to raise, usually, his hand,185 community-service
projects that create bonding across divisional lines, 186 and depicting boys
playing with dolls or dancing are all getting results.'87  Girls become
more assertive, boys call out less and are less disruptive, 189 and
segregation begins to break down. 190 A teacher who attended a workshop
of the Sadkers' shared a technique where she gives students a set number
of poker chips at the beginning of a class, telling them that everyone
must spend all of their chips by talking in class.'91 The technique
involved the girls more, she said, but even better, "[t]he students who
usually dominate the classroom receive a wonderful lesson, too. Because
they can talk only twice, they must choose which comments to say. Now
noisy students are doing something they never did before: They think
before they speak." 92 Such a technique transforms the entire classroom
and, as a result, it provides a better and fairer education to all.
The only teacher whose real name is used in Peggy Orenstein's
Schoolgirls is Ms. Logan, who requires students to do two monologues
as African-American history makers, one female and one male, during
their African-American history unit. 193
"This is learning from the inside out," she explains enthusiastically. "They do
the research, they connect into that other life, and they really become the
person. People always ask me how you can get boys to stop being so totally
male-oriented. I say, 'You just do it, and they'll pick it up as you go.' . . . It's a
184. Sex segregation is a major phenomenon in elementary schools. SADKER &
SADKER, supra note 133, at 64; Thome, supra note 157, at 87. It creates misunderstandings
between students, reinforces the messages boys get about masculinity and the inferiority
of girls, and contributes to girls' invisibility because teachers' attentions are drawn to the
male sections of the classroom, and girls are ignored as a group. SADKER & SADKER,
supra note 133, at 62-65. Teachers often organize activities and sort children by gender
instead of organizing and legitimating cross-sex contact. Thorne, supra note 157, at 89-
90, 97.
185. ORENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 30, 245; SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 99,
307.
186. ORENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 165-66.
'187. SADKER & SADKER, supra note 133, at 223-25; Connell, supra note 182, at
151-52.
188. SADKER& SADKER, supra note 133, at 273-74.
189. ORENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 266.
190. SADKER & SADKER, supra note 133, at 276.
191. SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 248-49.
192. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. ORENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 247-57.
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thrill for me to hear the way boys stand up for women's rights in their
monologues." 194
Later, Orenstein talks to an eleven-year-old white boy who wrote an
essay on Anita Hill for a NOW contest and performed a monologue as
Etta James.195 As Orenstein interrupts his work on the Rosa Parks square
for the class's "Women We Admire" quilt, "Jeremy turns to [her] in
exasperation. 'I don't see what the big deal is about women,' he says. ...
'I mean, as long as they're interesting, what's the difference if they're
women? Women are people, too, you know."'
1 96
In sum, coeducational reforms to improve equity and girls' and boys'
relative success in school have been undertaken and undertaken
successfully. When motivated to do so, teachers and schools have plenty
of tools both available and proven to achieve gender equity in coeducation.
3. Sex-Segregated Educational Initiatives
The actual and potentially more widespread success of coeducational
reforms, if more widely adopted, begs the question, then, why so many
educators are turning to sex-segregated programs to promote greater
equity and better relative educational achievement between girls and
boys. One potential explanation is that the real goal of such proponents
is to promote school choice. However, the school choice movement is
not the focus here because the school choice movement has supported
sex-segregated education as merely one way to expand school options,
not for some reason intrinsic to sex segregation itself.
Another potential explanation is that the consideration of sex-
segregated education as a solution to the gendered hidden curriculum has
coincided on the one hand with the positive views and experiences of
sex-segregated education held by some influential women lawmakers
and policymakers,197 and on the other hand with the promotion of sex-
segregated education by proponents of brain research allegedly showing
significant sex-based brain differences.'98 This somewhat strange alliance
194. Id. at 257.
195. Id at 274.
196. Id
197. Hillary Clinton, who cosponsored the portion of the No Child Left Behind Act
that led to the regulations, figures most prominently among these influential women.
147 CONG. REc. 10,180 (2001) (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton).
198. See generally Boys' Brains vs. Girls' Brains: What Sex Segregation Teaches
Students, ACLU (May 19, 2008), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/boys-brains-vs-
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has received an occasional boost from the school choice movement 99
and received a nationwide seal of approval when ED announced its
intent to allow sex-segregated programs in 2002 and passed regulations
to that effect in 2006.200
Ultimately, regardless of the reasons, the topic of sex-segregated
education has generated an enormous amount of research, as well as an
enormous amount of argument over the quality, methodology, and
relevance of this research. For this reason, the focus here is mainly on
overall reviews of the existing research, in an attempt to determine what
the empirical evidence says as a whole about the value of single-sex
education in improving boys' and girls' relative educational achievement
and gender equity in education. The overall conclusion resulting from
this examination is that evidence of the benefits of sex-segregated education
is inconclusive, whereas evidence of its harms is getting increasing
attention and is worthy of serious concern.
The first of the reviews of research on sex-segregated education was
conducted by the American Association of University Women in 1997,
which brought sixteen prominent researchers together for a roundtable to
examine and discuss twenty years' worth of research on K-12 single-sex
education. 2 01 Among other findings, the group agreed that there was no
202evidence that sex-segregated education was "better" than coeducation.
The researchers also expressed concern that sex-segregated programs
would "have effects on other classrooms . . . by siphoning off students
from coed classes and skewing the sex ratio in those classes," and that
sex-segregated education's "appeal . . . to policymakers often has little to
do with the classes' effectiveness" but rather are designed to "'relieve
pressure on the system' without necessarily making substantive changes." 20 3
Another major examination of the research was undertaken by Professor
Nancy Levit, who made "an attempt to catalog the principal quantitative
and qualitative studies, from elementary through postsecondary education,
girls-brains-what-sex-segregation-teaches-students-0 (quoting GURIAN INST., TEACHER
TRAINING MATERIALS: How BOYS AND GIRLS LEARN DIFFERENTLY (2006); and
LEONARD SAX, WHY GENDER MATTERS: WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS NEED To KNow
ABOUT THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 218-28 (2005)).
199. See, e.g., Lea Hubbard & Amanda Datnow, Are Single-Sex Schools
Sustainable in the Public Sector?, in GENDER IN POLICY AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON
SINGLE-SEX AND COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLING 109, 115 (Amanda Datnow & Lea
Hubbard eds., 2002).
200. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1) (2011); Single-Sex Classes and Schools: Guidelines
on Title IX Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,102 (May 8, 2002).
201. AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., SEPARATED aY SEX: A CRITICAL
LOOK AT SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION FOR GIRLS 1 (1998) [hereinafter SEPARATED BY SEX].
202. Id. at 2-3.
203. Id. at 9.
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that evaluate the benefits and detriments of single-sex education."204
She concluded that the "'general consensus' about positive education
and socialization effects of single-sex education simply does not exist"
and notes several deficiencies in the research methodologies used in the
studies showing such positive effects. 205
A third review was conducted by ED itself, for which the result was
again "equivocal," finding "some" or "limited" support for both "the
premise that single-sex schooling can be helpful," and that it "may be
harmful or that coeducational schooling is more beneficial." 2 06 Of the
2,221 studies initially culled from an "exhaustive search of electronic
databases," only eighty-eight were not eliminated from the review
for factors such as "obvious methodological considerations (e.g.,
nonstudy, weak study)." 20 7 Of those eighty-eight quantitative studies,
even when ED relaxed its usual standards, only forty made it into the
final review because of most studies' failure to include statistical controls
for factors such as "religious values, financial privilege, selective
admissions, or other . .. differences that might account for the differences
between single-sex and coeducational schools."208 The review acknowledges
that studies on single-sex education may never be able to meet the usual
standards because "the inclusion of covariates cannot control for important
unobservable differences between the groups, such as motivation."209
Two studies deserve individualized attention because they focused on
K-12 public education and made an attempt to improve on many of the
studies whose problems were noted in the reviews discussed above. The
first was conducted on a set of six paired public "single-gender academies"
204. Levit, supra note 10, at 473.
205. Id. at 503.
206. FRED MAEL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SINGLE-SEX VERSUS COEDUCATIONAL
SCHOOLING: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW, at x (2005), available at http://www2.ed.gov/
rschstat/evallother/single-sex/single-sex.pdf.
207. Id.
208. Id. at xi.
209. Id.; see also Weil, supra note 129 ("Cornelius Riordan, a Providence College
professor ... explained ... that such muddled findings are the norm for education
research on school effects. School-effects studies try to answer questions like whether
large schools are better than small schools or whether charter schools are better than
public schools. The effects are always small. So many variables are at play in a school:
quality of teachers, quality of the principal, quality of the infrastructure, involvement of
families, financing, curriculum-the list is nearly endless."). According to Riordan,
"You're never going to be able to compare two types of schools and say, 'The data very
strongly suggests that schools that look like a are better than schools that look like b."'
Id.
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created by California in 1998.210 Funded by then-Governor Pete Wilson
to promote school choice and "stimulate competition," 2 11 the academies
were seen by parents, teachers, and administrators as a way to meet "at-
risk" students' needs, were not focused on the single-sex aspects of the
schools,212 and did not provide any specific training on gender.2 13
Segregating students by sex put a strain on scarce resources and
facilities,214 and while some teachers of girls-only classes embraced the
opportunity, many teachers anticipated discipline problems in the all-
boys classes and did not want to teach them.2 15 "By separating girls and
boys, gender became the primary marker of identity,"216 and gender
differences were "made paramount to any commonalities."217 As a result,
the academies not only did not challenge but seemed to reinforce
students' and teachers' "traditional gender expectations."21 8 Ultimately,
all but one of the pairs of academies closed within three years.219
The second study compared the educational achievement of students
in a public all-girls middle school in Arizona with girls in coeducational
schools in the same district and tried to control for factors that are
analytically separate from a school's single-sex character, such as
student motivation, school selectivity, and peer quality.220 With regard
to student motivation and school selectivity, the researchers found that
although the sex-segregated school purported to use a lottery to select
students, the girls admitted to the all-girls school had significantly higher
preadmission achievement scores than the girls who wanted to attend but
were not selected for the all-girls school.22 1 In addition, the students in
the all-girls school and a coeducational magnet school performed
similarly well during their first year enrolled in these schools, leading
researchers to suggest that "it is overall peer quality, rather than the
gender composition of the schools, that explains single-sex school
210. Hubbard & Datnow, supra note 199, at 109.
211. Id. at 115.
212. Id at I17.
213. See id
214. Id. at 125.
215. Id. at 120.
216. Elisabeth L. Woody, Constructions of Masculinity in California's Single-
Gender Academies, in GENDER IN POLICY & PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON SINGLE-SEX
AND COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLING, supra note 199, at 280, 301.
217. Id. at 286.
218. Id. at 301.
219. Hubbard & Datnow, supra note 199, at 109.
220. Amy Roberson Hayes et al., The Efficacy of Single-Sex Education: Testing for
Selection and Peer Quality Effects, 65 SEx ROLES 693, 694-96 (2011), available at
http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/deptarea/Developmental/news files/pdfs/
pubs/HayesPahlkeBigler2011 .pdf.
221. Id. at 701.
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students' outperformance of coeducational school students."222 The
study concluded that "the efficacy of single-sex schools may not be a
function of the gender composition of the school" because both student
and school selection biases cause sex-segregated schools to have higher-
performing student bodies to begin with, and this overall higher peer
quality is more likely what causes higher student achievement-just like
223in coeducational schools with similarly higher-performing students.
Although these research reviews and individual studies are equivocal
as to benefits and express only limited concerns regarding harms that
may come from sex-segregated education, the vast majority of the
research they review has been conducted on all-girls education. In contrast,
various observers of all-boys education have noted serious concerns
regarding the harms present in those environments. These harms are
predicated on evidence that the masculinity lessons of the hidden
curriculum, which have been shown to be harmful in the coeducational
context, are intensified in all-male environments. This makes sense,
given that traditional masculinity is constructed to denigrate femininity and
thus encourages boys to avoid and devalue any and all things feminine,
especially girls.224 Institutionally separating girls and boys shows adult
approval for such attitudes and therefore likely tends to encourage them.
In fact, an oft-noted aspect of single-sex education for boys was the
outdated gendered behavior encouraged and the negative attitudes towards
girls and women observed there. Valerie Lee, who has conducted extensive
research on sex-segregated education, said that although sexism occurred in
all schools, "in boys' schools we saw incidents that went beyond the
pale. When I see a class of boys talking about women as a collection of
body parts hooked together, I think it's a scandal."22 5 The Sadkers agree,
saying that "the most clearly disturbing forms of sexism occurred in
boys' schools."226 For example,
[i]n all-male classrooms teachers encouraged boys to be aggressive . . .; one
even addressed his students as "studs." . . . [D]iscussions of sexual scenes in
literature sometimes degenerated into the treatment of girls as sex objects. . ..
222. Id. at 702.
223. Id.
224. Kimmel, supra note 161, at 142.
225. SADKER ET AL., supra note 130, at 279.
226. SADKER & SADKER, supra note 133, at 240.
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[S]exual depictions of women decorated the walls in several all-boys
schools. 227
Finally, the researchers of the California single-gender academies noted
that, at one academy, the boys were required to follow a traditionally
masculine code of conduct, including such rules as standing when a
woman entered the room, which "instilled a strong sense of male privilege
and authority. Men were either positioned as the protector and provider
or as the predator, and women were either in need of assistance or in a
position of sexual objectification." 228 Accordingly, "[g]irls at this academy
were most likely to express fears and frustration about persistent sexual
harassment from their male peers. Likewise, as [female] researchers, we
experienced discomfort and disrespect . . . in interviews with boys at
this school that were never experienced anywhere else throughout the
project. 22 9
These comments are a less intense and disturbing version of the violently
misogynistic and homophobic behavior often featured in examinations
of other all-male schools. For instance, Susan Faludi examined the Citadel
during and immediately after Shannon Faulkner's successful challenge
of the Citadel's exclusion of women. "That this crucible of masculine
transformation could be misogynistic was a vast understatement," she
concludes, reviewing the harassment of female faculty members, tacitly
encouraged and tolerated by male faculty and administrators; abuse and
humiliation of "the dates," followed by bragging about these activities;
cadences with "lyrics about gouging out a woman's eyes, lopping off
body parts, and evisceration"; and the use of "female" as the ultimate
insult among the cadets. 23 0 She also notes that, especially in times of
anxiety and crisis, the Citadel was "a campus consumed with a fascination
for and fear of homosexuality," including such behavior as upperclassmen
warning freshmen not to bend down to pick up soap in the showers
because, they would warn, "[w]e'll use you like we used those girls,"
and beatings of sophomores called "Bananarama," where cadets were
sodomized with bananas.231 Her observations fit with findings that boys
in single-sex classes receive the most harassment, perhaps because, in
the absence of girls, certain boys are forced into feminine-gendered roles
227. Id.
228. Woody, supra note 216, at 288.
229. Id.
230. SusAN FALuDI, STIFFED: THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN MAN 116-19 (1999).
231. Id. at 146.
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such as "sissies."232 Given these dynamics, it is no surprise that both boys
and teachers prefer coed over single-sex classes for boys.233
Perhaps most disturbingly, statements from such sex-segregated
education proponents as Leonard Sax and Michael Gurian uncritically
promote sex-segregated education as a necessary response to characteristics
associated with traditional masculinity, which these proponents claim
are biologically based in boys' brains. Any boy who does not exhibit
such characteristics, moreover, must be educated to become more
traditionally masculine. For instance, as reviewed by the ACLU, Leonard
Sax claims that
[a] boy who likes to read, who does not enjoy contact sports, and who does not
have a lot of close male friends has a problem, even if he thinks he is happy.
He should be firmly disciplined, required to spend time with "normal males,"
and made to play sports.
234
The ACLU also notes that Michael Gurian accounts for the statistical
differences in boys' and girls' math and science achievement by stating:
Boys are better than girls in math because boys' bodies receive daily surges of
testosterone. Girls have similar skills only during the few days in their
menstrual cycle when they have an estrogen surge. Because of this estrogen
surge, "an adolescent girl may perform well on any test, including math, a few
days a month." Boys can do well any day.235
Gurian also trains teachers that "[p]ursuit of power is a universal male
trait. Pursuit of a comfortable environment is a universal female trait."236
Sex-segregated education proponents such as Sax and Gurian very
selectively use research that has supposedly found sex-based brain
differences in children to support the need for sex-segregated education.
Several overall reviews of this brain research have found that these
distortions come on top of even bigger methodological problems and
more inconclusive findings in the brain research than in the single-sex
education research. One such comprehensive review of the brain research
232. Pamela Haag, Single-Sex Education in Grades K-12: What Does the Research
Tell Us?, in SEPARATED BY SEX, supra note 201, at 13, 20.
233. Patricia B. Campbell & Ellen Wahl, What's Sex Got To Do With It? Simplistic
Questions, Complex Answers, in SEPARATED BY SEX, supra note 201, at 63, 66-67; Levit,
supra note 10, at 499.
234. Boys' Brains vs. Girls'Brains, supra note 198 (citing SAX, supra note 198, at
218-28).
235. Id. (quoting MICHAEL GURIAN & ARLETTE C. BALLEW, THE BOYS AND GIRLS
LEARN DIFFERENTLY: ACTION GUIDE FOR TEACHERS 100 (2003)).
236. Id. (quoting GURIAN INST., supra note 198).
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by neuroscientist and professor Lise Eliot found "surprisingly little solid
evidence of sex differences in children's brains."237 In fact, "the behavioral
and psychological differences between males and females [are m]uch
smaller . . . than our physical differences are and, notably, quite small
compared to the range of performance within each sex."238 Furthermore,
the research claims of sex-based brain differences are either "blatantly
false, plucked out of thin air because they sound about right[,] ...
cherry-picked from single studies[,] or extrapolated from rodent research
without any effort to critically evaluate all the data, account for conflicting
studies, or even state that the results have never been confirmed in
humans."2 39
Professor Eliot particularly debunks many of the premises on which
sex-segregation proponents rely. For instance, she characterizes as
"disingenuous" Leonard Sax's reliance on sex differences in seeing and
hearing to justify his sex-segregated teaching methods, 2 40 and she states
that "a close look at the research on sensory differences in newborns
reveals that they are small and of little relevance to children's learning."241
Without naming him, she also addresses Michael Gurian's claims that
hormones affect math and science ability when she discusses the many
studies that have failed to prove this premise and concludes that "high-
school girls have no reason to postpone their geometry tests if they
happen to be ovulating during finals week. Nor is circulating testosterone
the reason why males consistently outperform females in . . . any other
cognitive ability."242 Finally, although these problematic studies and
conclusions are often splashed about in the media, Eliot attributes this to
the "file-drawer effect": studies finding no sex difference languish in the
researchers' file drawers because they are less interesting and therefore
less publishable.243
Like Eliot, psychologist Cordelia Fine exposes serious methodological
problems with much of the brain difference research.244 Fine also spends a
significant amount of time tracing the path between such studies and the
warped claims of popular writers, including sex-segregation proponents
such as Gurian and Sax, whose ideas Fine describes as a "self-serving
237. ELIOT, supra note 26, at 5.
238. Id. at I1.
239. Id. at 8.
240. Id. at 62.
241. Id. at 59. Eliot also notes that Sax's "presentation of the actual data on single-
sex schools suffers from the same sort of cherry-picking as his proclamations about the
neurologic differences between boys and girls . . . ." Id at 304.
242. Id. at 228.
243. Id. at 10.
244. See, e.g., CORDELIA FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER: How OUR MINDS, SOCIETY,
AND NEUROSEXISM CREATE DIFFERENCE 15-17, 112-17 (2010).
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projection of prejudices onto brain jargon."245 Her investigations show
that much of what has been presented as scientific research showing sex-
based brain differences is not only problematic to begin with but also has
gone through an additional process of distortion on its way to consumption
by the general public. For instance, Fine repeatedly mentions Louann
Brizendine, author of The Female Brain, a book that reviewers in Nature
characterized as so "riddled with scientific errors" and "rife with 'facts'
that do not exist in the supporting references" 246 that Professor Mark
Liberman has described his attempts to correct Brizendine's errors as
akin to "the circus clown that follows the elephant around the ring with a
shovel." 24 7
Fine also devotes several chapters to reviewing studies that exhaustively
demonstrate the ways in which societal expectations and constructions
regarding gender affect and interact with cognitive and psychological
functions such as intellectual abilities and interests. Among other things,
she discusses a virtual treasure trove of studies regarding "stereotype
threat," 2 4 8 whereby individual performance on certain tests is affected-
often negatively-when individuals taking the test are reminded of their
identity group-woman, Asian-American, European, et cetera-even in
the most seemingly innocuous ways, such as answering demographic
questions prior to taking a standardized test. 24 9 She concludes that
[w]hen the environment makes gender salient, there is a ripple effect on the
mind. We start to think of ourselves in terms of our gender, and stereotypes
and social expectations become more prominent in the mind. This can change
self-perception, alter interests, debilitate or enhance ability, and trigger
unintentional discrimination.250
245. Id. at 155 (referring to the work of John Gray); see also id. 112, 139-40
(criticizing the work of Gurian and Sax).
246. Id. at 158 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rebecca M. Young &
Evan Balaban, Psychoneuroindoctrinology, 443 NATURE 634 (2006) (book review)).
247. Id. (quoting Mark Liberman, The Spread ofBogus Numbers in the Meme Pool,
LANGUAGE LOG (Dec. 16, 2006, 8:08 PM), http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/
archives/003923.html) (internal quotation marks omitted). Fine also provides repeated
examples where Brizendine cites studies and communications supposedly proving that
women's brains are more "wired" for empathy when those studies or communications
were conducted only on one sex-such that they could not compare the sexes-never
sought to compare males and females, did not make the findings Brizendine claims, or
simply do not exist. Id. at 158-61.
248. See, e.g., id at 30-38, 42-44, 50-52, 172-73, 184-85.
249. Id. at 31-32.
250. Id. at xxvi.
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Eliot provides a biological explanation for this phenomenon: brain
plasticity. Brain plasticity means that the brain changes in response to
experience, and therefore, quite simply, "your brain is what you do with
it."25 In fact, Eliot concludes that, although there are small biological
differences between the sexes at birth, it is gender socialization,
incorporated into the brain through plasticity, that causes the "troublesome
gaps" that develop between girls and boys.252 She notes:
[Because l]eaming and practice rewire the human brain . . . considering the
very different ways boys and girls spend their time while growing up, as well as
the special potency of early experience in molding neuronal connections, it would
be shocking if the two sexes' brains didn't work differently by the time they
were adults. 253
Furthermore, she explains, "the male-female differences that have the most
impact-cognitive skills, such as speaking, reading, math, and mechanical
ability; and interpersonal skills, such as aggression, empathy, risk taking,
and competitiveness-are heavily shaped by learning." 254
For these reasons, both Fine and Eliot conclude that education-both
formal and informal-matters, but more importantly, the type of education
matters. And neither is too keen on sex-segregated education. Although
Eliot acknowledges that there may be "sound reasons to advocate single-
sex schooling," she insists that "sex differences in children's brains or
hormones are not among them." 255 Indeed, the main conclusion of
Eliot's central point regarding brain plasticity is that if we want children
of both sexes to achieve and to improve in the areas in which they tend
to be weaker, we need to give them less gender-stereotypic experiences
so their plastic brains will grow in more balanced ways. She points out
that "[t]he more similar boys' and girls' activities are, the more similar
their brains will be," and that "[t]here can be no doubt that success in our
world increasingly requires a mixture of male and female strengths."25 6
Therefore, "[t]he earlier we can step in and tweak kids' growing neurons
and synapses, the better our chances of raising both boys and girls with
well-balanced sets of skills."257
251. ELIOT, supra note 26, at 6.
252. Id. at 6-7.
253. Id. at 6.
254. Id. at 6-7.
255. Id at 305.
256. Id at 16.
257. Id
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Eliot also gives much evidence in support of her conclusion that "each
gender has much to learn from the other."258 On the one hand, early sex
segregation on the playground leads to "gender intensification": "Boys
spend their time with other boys, sealing the boys-will-be-boys prophecy;
girls hang out with other girls, honing one another's chatty, cautious, and
decidedly pink preferences. . . leav[ing] boys and girls with few similarities
by the time they finish kindergarten."2 59 In contrast, studies of children
with older, opposite-sex siblings have shown that the younger siblings
have more balanced masculine and feminine traits,260 with corresponding
benefits for their cognitive and emotional skills. 2 61 As the younger siblings
seek to imitate their older, opposite-sex siblings, the younger siblings
tend to develop interests and activities in less gender-stereotypic ways,
and their abilities become more well-rounded.26 2 Thus, "coed classes
are ultimately a better environment for deflating stereotypes of the opposite
sex," and "the greater risk-of gender stereotyping and the loss of mutual
understanding-makes such segregation a step in the wrong direction." 263
Fine is even more negative-even grim-about sex-segregated
education, largely because of links between the brain research-and its
disingenuous use by sex segregation proponents-first to the perpetuation
of stereotyping and then to potential discrimination. Fine explains these
links, first, by discussing studies showing that people tend to believe
scientific-particularly neuroscientific-explanations that they would
otherwise identify as specious and are therefore less likely to be skeptical of
the accuracy of the sex-based brain differences research.2" Then, she
reminds us of the ways in which "so-called experts" such as Sax and
Gurian have distorted findings-that were not particularly conclusive to
begin with-of much brain research to support gender stereotyping of
the kind quoted above. 2 65  Finally, she reviews studies showing that
258. Id at 312; see also Levit, supra note 10, at 499 ("Other research suggests that
girls in the classroom exert a positive influence on the behavior of boys. Boys, it seems,
benefit from the presence of girls . . . .").
259. ELIOT, supra note 26, at 154.
260. Id. at 41-42, 122, 136, 155, 161, 279.
261. Id at 161, 279.
262. Id at 122-23.
263. Id at 312.
264. See, e.g., FINE, supra note 244, at 171-72 (discussing a study where the
addition of a clause referring to brain scans kept participants from identifying an
explanation that, without the "neurononsense," they easily identified as circular).
265. Id at 172. Here, Fine gets help again from Professor Mark Liberman, who has
analyzed and fact-checked Sax in particular and has concluded that "the disproportion
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explanations of gender that "emphasize biological factors leave us more
inclined to agree with gender stereotypes, to self-stereotype ourselves,
and even for our performance to fall in line with those stereotypes. "266
These studies include one in which women who had been given an
article that attributed sex differences in mathematical ability to genetics
performed worse on a mathematical standardized test than women who
were told that sex differences in mathematical ability were due to men's
greater efforts in math.267 Even more disturbingly, in a similar study,
male participants who read an article that presented gender differences
as scientific "fact," in comparison to male participants who read an article
that presented gender differences as under debate within the scientific
community, were
more cavalier about discriminatory practices: compared with men who read the
"debate" article, they agreed more with statements like "If I would work in a
company where my manager preferred hiring men to women, I would privately
support him," and "If I were a manager in a company myself, I would believe
that more often than not, promoting men is a better investment in the future of
the company than promoting women." 268
Thus, according to Fine's analysis, the justification of single-sex education
using mischaracterized "facts" supposedly based in neuroscience increases
the damaging effects of stereotyping even as far as possibly encouraging
or at least excusing gender discrimination.
Thus, as the foregoing review has shown, although coeducation has its
problems, three decades of research and experience demonstrate that it is
infinitely reformable and that teachers and school officials who are
committed to addressing gender inequities in school have a range of
techniques available that are proven to work in coeducational settings.
Furthermore, research on sex-segregated education has turned up evidence
of at least as many harmful as beneficial effects of such programs.
Therefore, a comparison of sex-segregated education with reformed
between the reported facts and Sax's interpretation is spectacular," and that Sax and
Gurian's use of scientific data is "shockingly careless, tendentious and even dishonest.
Their over-interpretation and mis-interpretation of scientific research is so extreme that it
becomes a form of fabrication." Id at 164-65 (quoting Mark Liberman, Are Men
Emotional Children?, LANGUAGE LOG (June 24, 2006, 6:19 AM), http://itre.cis.
upenn.edu/-myl/languagelog/archives/003284.html; and Mark Liberman, Blinding Us
with Science, LANGUAGE LOG (June 19, 2007, 10:01 AM), http://itre.cis.upenn.
edu/-myl/languagelog/archives/004618.html). And then there are the out-and-out liars,
such as the educational speaker who reportedly accounts for supposed cognitive
differences by stating that "the 'crockus'-a region of the brain that does not exist-is
four times larger in girls than in boys." Id. at 162.
266. Id. at 172.
267. Id. at 172-73.
268. Id. at 185.
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coeducation demonstrates the clear superiority of reforming coeducation
as a way to improve educational outcomes for both girls and boys.
B. The Constitutional Analysis
It is into this indisputably rich and controversial context that ED
entered when it passed its regulations allowing public school districts to
create sex-segregated programs. Those regulations were quickly followed
by litigation, including in Vermilion Parish and A.NA. 26 9 Because neither
case was decided based on the constitutional equal protection question,270
they are only discussed here to the extent that they show the types of sex-
segregated programs that the 2006 regulations are encouraging schools to
form and why those programs are vulnerable to a constitutional challenge.
The 2006 regulations allow single-sex classes and activities in K-12
public schools under conditions that take their language from the
intermediate scrutiny test. Schools must have an "important objective,"
and the single-sex method must be "substantially related to achieving
that objective." 2 7 1 The regulations further permit two possible goals: (1) to
"improve educational achievement of [a school's] students, through a
recipient's overall established policy to provide diverse educational
opportunities,"2 72 and (2) to "meet the particular, identified educational
needs of its students."273 By doing so, on their face the regulations suggest
269. Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 F. App'x 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2011);
A.N.A. ex rel. S.F.A. v. Breckinridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 833 F. Supp. 2d 673 (W.D.
Ky. 2011).
270. In Vermilion Parish, the Fifth Circuit found in favor of the student plaintiff on
a standing question and remanded the case to the district court on a mootness question.
421 F. App'x at 374, 376. As a result, it did not address the equal protection issues,
other than disagreeing with the district court's finding that "intentional discrimination"
was required to trigger a review of the program's constitutionality and stating that
because the program used facial sex classifications, the court did not need a finding of
intentional discrimination to prompt such a review. Id. at 372. Similar to the district
court in Vermilion Parish, the district court in A.N.A. seems to misunderstand sex-
segregated programs as facial sex classifications. It found that the student plaintiffs did
not have standing because there was no injury in fact, stating that "[t]he Supreme Court
has never held that separating students by sex in a public school-unlike separating
students by race-or offering a single-sex public institution is per se unconstitutional"
and finding "no evidence of . .. discrimination" in the record, seeming not to realize that
the facial sex classification involved in the school's programs is all the evidence required
to trigger equal protection review. A.N.A., 833 F. Supp. 2d at 678-79.
271. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(i) (2011).
272. Id. § 106.34(b)(1)(i)(A).
273. Id. § 106.34(b)(1)(i)(B).
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that single-sex educational initiatives can be constitutional, but a closer
look suggests otherwise. Indeed, such initiatives are unlikely to escape
having the intermediate scrutiny test applied to them because girls and
boys are in fact similarly situated with regard to education. Once the test
is applied, moreover, because it requires a comparison of sex-segregated
programs to the sex-neutral alternative of reforming coeducation, it is
frankly hard to imagine sex-segregated public education programs passing
the intermediate scrutiny test. With three decades of research and
experience demonstrating the clear superiority and proven effectiveness
of reforming coeducation to address gender inequalities in K-12 schools, the
likelihood that the Court will approve a sex classification-especially one
that carries with it potentially serious harms-seems slim to none.
1. The "Similarly Situated" Inquiry
First, as discussed above, the Court has upheld facial legislative
distinctions between the sexes based on those distinctions involving
areas where men and women are not similarly situated, namely in cases
involving pregnancy, proof of parenthood, and combat.274 Because
education does not involve pregnancy, proof of parenthood, or combat, it
is unlikely that the Court will conclude that boys and girls are not similarly
situated when it comes to education.
Moreover, the highly contested research on sex-based brain differences is
unlikely to lead to girls and boys being regarded as not similarly situated
in learning abilities. For one thing, the research is too questionable to
establish any clear scientific proof that such differences exist, or even if
they did exist, that they suggest children should be taught in single-sex
groupings. In fact, in their comprehensive reviews of the brain differences
research, Lise Eliot and Cordelia Fine conclude exactly the opposite:
that any sex-based brain differences are very small at birth, can be
greatly influenced by social factors, including education, due to the
brain's plasticity, and are likely to be increased-to the detriment of
students' educational outcomes generally-by sex segregation.275 For
another thing, the Court has made it clear that it is skeptical about sex
classifications that must rely on complicated empirical studies and proof
to prove their worth.27 6 In contrast to the claims about sex-based brain
differences, the non-similarly-situated areas already identified in the Court's
jurisprudence-pregnancy, proof of parenthood, and combat-are all
based on simpler, more common observations. It is a simpler proposition to
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274. See supra Part II.A.
275. ELIoT, supra note 26, at 312; FINE, supra note 244, at 165.
276. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
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say that only women can get pregnant, that there are difficulties in
proving parenthood with men that do not exist for women, and that
women are excluded from combat positions in the military, than it is to
say women and men or even girls and boys have brain differences that
are completely biological and separate from social factors.
Because girls and boys are in fact similarly situated in matters relevant
to education, and because sex-segregated educational initiatives make
facial distinctions based on sex, such programs will be assessed under
the intermediate scrutiny test. As explained above, this means that any
public single-sex educational initiative needs to be substantially related
to an important government objective.
2. Important Government Objective
Four possible important government objectives are commonly advanced
for sex-segregated education: (1) educational choice,27 7 (2) better
education,2 78 (3) gender equity or compensation for discrimination,279
277. Jolee Land, Note, Not Dead Yet: The Future of Single-Sex Education After
United States v. Virginia, 27 STETSON L. REV. 297, 318 (1997); see also JOHN E. CHUBB
& TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 215-19 (1990)
(analyzing the benefits of school choice); Caroline M. Hoxby, Does Competition Among
Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?, 90 AM. EcoN. REV. 1209, 1228-29
(2000) (discussing the effects of school choice on academic achievement); Jenkins,
supra note 11, at 1974-76 (concluding that the Court is likely to "find increasing
diversity of educational options a sufficiently important objective for single-sex schools,
at least when such diversity is offered to both sexes"); Johnson, supra note 10, at 669
("The Court has seemingly recognized ... provision of a diversity of educational choices
as an important state interest. . . ."); James M. Sullivan, Note, The Single-Sex Education
Choice Facing School Districts After the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 Is Not the
One That Congress Intended, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 381, 397 (2003)
("There is a strong case that providing a diversity of educational options will be found an
important, if not compelling, government interest.").
278. Jenkins, supra note 11, at 1971-74; Tod Christopher Gurney, Comment, The
Aftermath of the Virginia Military Institute Decision: Will Single-Gender Education
Survive?, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1183, 1212 (1998); Johnson, supra note 10, at 662-
68; Land, supra note 277, at 317; Sullivan, supra note 277, at 388.
279. Jenkins, supra note 11, at 1976-78; Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination
Analysis After United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality ofK-12 Single-
Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 419; Carr, supra note 10, at 435-37;
Carrie Corcoran, Comment, Single-Sex Education After VMI: Equal Protection and East
Harlem's Young Women's Leadership School, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 987, 1032 (1997);
Johnson, supra note 10, at 655-62; Kiselewich, supra note 10, at 240; Land, supra note
277, at 317; Sullivan, supra note 277, at 392; Fred von Lohmann, Note, Single-Sex
Courses, Title 1, and Equal Protection: The Case for Self-Defense for Women, 48
STAN. L. REV. 177, 213 (1995).
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and (4) experimenting with or studying the effects of public K-12 single-
sex education.2 80 ED's 2006 regulations incorporate two-possibly three-
of these goals, educational choice and better education, both generally
and as a compensatory measure, but only better education and gender
equity or compensation for discrimination are likely to be accepted as
truly "important."
Educational choice is likely to be judged insufficiently important
because it is a means to the end of better education rather than constituting
an end in and of itself. Many proponents of school choice initiatives
promote choice as a way of spurring competition between schools, the
theory being that competition will increase quality among the competitors.
For instance, when Governor Wilson promoted the single-sex academies
discussed above, he made it clear that his primary motivation was to
expand school choice, and that the "single-gender academies will stimulate
competition." 2 8 1 This effort was thus part of an overall "choice movement"
fueled by "conservative social and political arguments regarding the power
of the free market to inspire educational innovation, improve achievement,
increase accountability, and regain parental support for public schooling." 282
Moreover, that educational choice would not be an end goal makes logical
sense because if the choice itself was the end goal, one would look no
farther than the fact that choice exists and would not consider the content
of that choice. However, making any educational choice would arguably
not be acceptable either to educational choice proponents or to courts.
Neither would promote an educational choice where, for instance, students
skateboarded all day and graduated from school illiterate.283 This is in
280. Jenkins, supra note 11, at 1978; Rosemary Salomone, Rich Kids, Poor Kids,
and the Single-Sex Education Debate, 34 AKRON L. REv. 209, 229 (2000); Gurney, supra
note 278, at 1214.
281. Hubbard & Datnow, supra note 199, at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).
282. Amanda Datnow et al., Single-Sex Public Schooling as a New Form of Choice:
Implications for Diversity, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND DIVERSITY: WHAT THE EVIDENCE
SAYS 112, 112 (Janelle T. Scott ed., 2005); see also Hoxby, supra note 277, at 1209
("[P]roponents [of increasing parental choice] hope that competition [will] improve
schools .... ).
283. Were the Court to accept a two-step, indirect justification such as "single-sex
education promotes educational choice which promotes the important government
objective of better education," it is worth noting that several empirical studies analyzing
the actual economics of school choice and whether competition does in fact lead to better
schools have not produced much evidence supporting this theory. See Hoxby, supra
note 277, at 1229 (saying that although choice between school districts is positively
correlated with increased educational achievement, the relationship of choice between
individual schools and increased achievement is "impossible to determine"); see also
Jesse Rothstein, Comment, Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students
and Taxpayers?, 97 AM. ECON. REv. 2026, 2026 (2007) ("Hoxby's positive estimated
effect of interdistrict competition on student achievement is not robust, and . . . a fair
reading of the evidence does not support claims of a large or significant effect. . . . The
774
[VOL. 49: 725, 2012] Single-Sex and Reformed Coeducation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
fact acknowledged by the structure of the clause addressing educational
choice in the 2006 regulations, which states that "diverse educational
opportunities" are a method "through" which a school can "improve
educational achievement." 2 84
Similarly, experimentation with sex-segregated education is unlikely
to be a sufficiently important government objective because it is also not
an end to itself. In addition, there is no equal protection case involving
sex classifications that has accepted experimentation of any kind as an
objective. Furthermore, the state of the current research on sex-segregated
education plays into the Court's general skepticism over empirical evidence.
First, as reviewed above, there have been many single-sex education
studies done already, and their cumulative proof for the benefits of single-
sex education is inconclusive at best. 2 8 5 Second, this inconclusiveness is
likely due in part to the fact that no studies where students or parents can
choose whether to send their students to a single-sex school or class can
adequately control for the "pro academic choice."286 The "pro academic
choice" refers to the fact that students and parents who exercise their
choices to go to a single-sex or other school with a particular pedagogical
strategy are more engaged in their own or their child's education. This
engagement itself may have as much or more to do with student
achievement than the characteristics of the school and its pedagogical
methods or demographic make-up because engaged students with parents
who care about their children's education tend to have more resources
for success and to value education more themselves. For these reasons,
the only kind of experiment that has any hope of producing results
illuminative enough to constitute an important government objective is
one that removes the choice factor altogether. However, because removing
all choice basically sacrifices the students in the experiment, without
their full consent, to the experiment itself, it is hard to imagine a court
upholding such an experiment.
In addition, as demonstrated by the Arizona experiment that sought to
control for such student/parent motivation factors, this motivation is
evidence that competition among schools will improve academic outcomes is thus
substantially weaker than it might have appeared.").
284. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(i)(A) (2011).
285. See SEPARATED BY SEX, supra note 201; Levit, supra note 10; see also MAEL
ET AL., supra note 206, at xv ("[A]ny positive effects of [single sex] schooling on long-
term indicators of academic achievement were not readily apparent.").
286. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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only one factor that may interfere with the reliability of a study seeking
to measure the effectiveness of the single-sex character of a school.287
Other factors include the school's selection of students and the academic
achievements of the peer students at the school.288 When the Arizona
study attempted to control such factors, it concluded that "the efficacy of
single-sex schools may not be a function of the gender composition of
the school."289 This provides more evidence that a goal of experimentation
is aimed at producing research that is in fact impossible to conduct.
Unlike educational choice and experimentation, better education,
educational equity, and compensation for past discrimination are not
subject to the criticisms advanced above and are in fact widely
acknowledged to be important goals. Nevertheless, under the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence, any specific single-sex initiative will
have to prove that one of these goals is its true goal and is not a pretext
for a different goal. For instance, Professor Valorie Vodjik points out
that the Young Women's Leadership School in Harlem is vulnerable to
attack because the history of its founding and current curriculum do not
demonstrate that it was originally formed for its stated compensatory
purpose: to improve girls' performance in math and science.290 Rather,
it originated with a conservative think tank with an agenda to privatize
schools, 291 and the intention to benefit girls was only announced after an
administrative complaint was filed against the school.292 In addition, the
Board of Education never discussed the plans and design of the school
with the Chancellor of Education's Task Force on Sex Equity in New
York Schools, and the mission and curriculum of the school were not
geared toward improving girls' math and science skills.293 To the extent
that there is evidence that a single-sex program has been promoted to
advance school choice or other goals rather than educational equity and
better education, those programs could have difficulties surviving
intermediate scrutiny.
287. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
288. Hayes et al., supra note 220, at 702.
289. Id.
290. Valorie K. Vojdik, Girls' Schools After VMT: Do They Make the Grade?, 4 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 69, 98 (1997); see also Young Women's Leadership School,
INSIDESCHOOLs, http://insideschools.org/high/browse/school/188 (last visited Oct. 8, 2012)
(noting the lack of advanced science and math courses).
291. Vojdik, supra note 290, at 69.
292. Id at 96.
293. Id. at 96-98.
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3. Substantial Relationship of Single-Sex Education to Better Education
and Educational Equity/Compensation for Past Discrimination
Even if better education and educational equity or compensation for
past discrimination are judged to be real and not pretextual goals, a sex-
segregated educational initiative must still be substantially related to the
achievement of better education, educational equity, or both. Because
the discussion about improving boys' and girls' performance is often a
comparative one-comparing girls' achievements to boys' and vice
versa-the two goals are a bit difficult to differentiate from each other,
particularly in the absence of a particular single-sex program as an
example. This is not necessarily solved by the 2006 regulations, which
are themselves general.
In addition, the 2006 regulations, although they refer to a substantial
relationship, 29 4 do nothing to guide or regulate schools so that any
single-sex programs they create do in fact bear a substantial relationship
to the improved-education goal. Although schools are directed to "conduct
periodic evaluations . .. at least every two years,"295 nothing in the
regulations indicates to whom those assessments need to be reported or
even that schools must cease sex-segregated programs if their
assessments prove they do not advance the government objective. In
addition, there is no mechanism for either enforcement by or consultation
with ED, although one can presumably file a complaint through the
standard process for violations of Title IX.29 6 School districts are therefore
essentially left on their own to devote the substantial resources involved
in assessing programs and determining their constitutionality, with
virtually no consequences should they not devote those resources.
In an attempt to fill this void, this subpart will discuss first the
application of the substantial relationship prong to the goal of better
education for all children, understanding that most of that discussion is
applicable to many educational equity goals as well. Second, this subpart
294. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1) (2011).
295. Id § 106.34(b)(4).
296. How the Office for Civil Rights Handles Complaints, U.S. DEP'T EDUC.,
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/complaints-how.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012)
(explaining that the Office of Civil Rights enforces Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, "which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex"); How To
File a Discrimination Complaint with the Office for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP'T EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/howto.html?src=rt (last visited Oct. 8,
2012).
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will examine whether single-sex education bears a substantial relationship
to the specific educational equity goal of compensating women for past
discrimination.
a. Better Education for All Children
The chief proponents of sex-segregated education as a method of
achieving the important government objective of better education for all
children are those who believe that girls and boys have biologically-
determined, sex-based brain differences that affect their learning abilities
and styles. As discussed above, these proponents argue that single-sex
education can adjust the classroom environment to these different sex-
based learning styles and abilities and to the underlying brain differences
because only one sex is present in the classroom. Because of the presence
of serious sexual stereotyping in the writings of many of these proponents,
as well as the questionable empirical support for their theories, single-
sex educational initiatives designed along the lines advocated by these
proponents are unlikely to pass the substantial relationship portion of the
intermediate scrutiny test. Moreover, even if these factors were not as
strong, when sex-segregated education is compared to the sex-neutral
alternative of reforming coeducation, which has been proven to be much
more effective in addressing the goal of better education for all children,
the sex classification must fall.
With regard to sexual stereotyping, the writings of sex-segregated
education proponents such as Leonard Sax and Michael Gurian that are
reviewed above are rife with stereotypes that would be almost laughable
if it were not so disturbing to think that teachers actually receive training
in these kinds of ideas. Unfortunately, however, Sax and Gurian are
only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the stereotyping that has
been repeatedly documented to occur in single-sex environments. The
authors who studied the single-sex academies in California observed that
the academies reinforced traditional gender stereotypes, including that
girls should be "feminine and.. . concerned about their appearance" and
,,297
boys should be "strong men and take care of their wives. Authors
such as Professors Verna Williams, Elisabeth Woody, Cohen, and Levit
have done more extensive analyses of stereotyping in the single-sex
education movement, including on the intersectionality of race and gender
stereotyping in single-sex education,298 on the intersectionality of gender
297. AMANDA DATNOW ET AL., IS SINGLE GENDER SCHOOLING VIABLE IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR?: LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA'S PILOT PROGRAM 7 (2001)
298. See generally Williams, Reform, supra note 10.
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and sexuality stereotyping in single-sex education,2 99 on the reinforcement
of traditional and essentialist masculinity by single-sex education,oo
and on the way in which educational segregation itself leads to
stereotyping.01 Finally, Faludi's account of life at the Citadel and research
conducted by authors such as Zittleman and the Sadkers show a disturbingly
misogynistic and homophobic culture at many all-male schools.30
The ample documentation of sex stereotyping in sex-segregated
educational initiatives is particularly damaging under the intermediate
scrutiny test when viewed in combination with empirical evidence
refuting the conclusions of much of the sex-based brain differences
research used by proponents such as Sax and Gurian to justify their
single-sex programs. For instance, Eliot's and Fine's reviews of the brain
differences research demonstrate the methodological problems with
much of the research upon which sex-segregated education proponents rely,
as well as how these proponents have further distorted that research.303
They also discuss the enormous amount of empirical evidence countering
the conclusions of this research3 04 and emphasize how the brain's plasticity
makes what happens in the home, school, and other social environments
a much larger influence on the brain's development of certain skills and
abilities than biological factors such as chromosomes and exposure to
prenatal testosterone.3 05
In fact, Eliot's and Fine's insights on brain plasticity are perhaps most
damaging when considered under the substantial relationship prong of
intermediate scrutiny because they provide a scientific explanation and
evidence supporting the Court's concern about "self-fulfilling
prophec[ies]."306 For example, both Eliot and Fine review the many
studies that have shown the influence of stereotype threat and "stereotype
lift" on both girls' and boys' performances on challenging tests. These
studies show how students' test scores are influenced by whether they
299. See generally Cohen, supra note 10.
300. See generally Woody, supra note 216.
301. See generally Levit, supra note 10.
302. See FALUDI, supra note 230, at 116-19; SADKER & SADKER, supra note 133, at
240-41; Woody, supra note 216, at 288-90.
303. ELIOT, supra note 26, at 304-06; FINE, supra note 244, at 162-65.
304. ELIOT, supra note 26, at 305-07; FINE, supra note 244, at 155-67.
305. ELIOT, supra note 26, at 6-8; FINE, supra note 244, at 236-37.
306. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542-43 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982)).
307. ELIOT, supra note 26, at 237-39; FINE, supra note 244, at 30-33.
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have been exposed to a stereotype about their group prior to taking the
test-with negative stereotypes resulting in a "threat" and poorer
performance and positive stereotypes resulting in a "lift" in performance. 308
Such studies, combined with studies showing rampant gender and racial
stereotyping in single-sex education, demonstrate that rather than advancing
the important government objective of increasing educational achievement,
single-sex education could actually lower students' educational achievement
through increasing the effects of stereotype threat.
Eliot's review of the research also suggests that a proposition exactly
opposite those advanced by sex-segregated education proponents is true
with regard to educational achievement and sex-based brain differences.
As mentioned above, the research on older and younger opposite-sex
siblings suggests that when children act in nonstereotypical ways to
emulate an admired member of the other sex such as an older sibling,
their brains develop in a more balanced fashion, and they can learn and
excel in more diverse subjects and skills.3 09 Contrary to the conclusions
of single-sex education proponents such as Sax and Gurian, this research
suggests that children's educational achievements benefit from more
interaction with children of the opposite sex and less sex segregation.
The schools involved in the Vermilion Parish and A.N.A. cases offer
concrete examples of Eliot's and Fine's critiques. In Vermilion Parish,
the school board approved an experimental single-sex middle school
program, largely because the school's principal only presented positive
studies of sex-segregated education to the board when he proposed the
experiment. 3 10 At the end of the experiment, the board approved an
expansion of the program based on the principal's presentation of
falsified evidence of the pilot's success.3 1' In light of these fraudulent
"successes," the school mandatorily assigned students to single-sex or
coeducational classes.312 Students and parents were only given a choice
after the plaintiff in the case wrote to the board to notify them of the
classes' illegality, a fact that the superintendent admitted not knowing. 3 13
In A.N.A., the Breckenridge County Middle School (BCMS) also began
sex-segregated classes as a pilot program that it quickly expanded to
virtually all classes.314 Before long, however, BCMS began to assign
308. ELIOT, supra note 26, at 237-39; FINE, supra note 244, at 30-33, 50.
309. ELIOT, supra note 26, at 122-23.
310. Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 F. App'x 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2011).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 369.
314. Memorandum of Law in Support of A.N.A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, A.N.A. ex rel. S.F.A. v. Breckinridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 833 F. Supp. 2d
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students to single-sex classes without giving students or parents a choice,
likely because it had trouble keeping class sizes balanced."'
Both of these school districts adopted theories and teaching
methodologies supposedly drawn from brain research and promoted by
proponents such as Sax and Gurian. Vermilion used different teaching
techniques in the all-girls, all-boys, and coed classes, including different
books for the boys' and girls' classes based on the students' "perceived
interests," "'action techniques' with boys," and "'a more quiet environment'
with girls."316 In A.N.A., BCMS articulated its approach as using different
teaching techniques according to what it described as each sex's
"specific needs," based on "[brain] research" that "supports theories that
boys and girls learn differently."317
In both cases, the schools adopted these techniques, first as an
experiment, then permanently, for the goal of improving educational
outcomes for the students. 31 However, in A.N.A., BCMS had in fact
never sought to measure the success of its sex-segregated classes in
improving education for the students, either through grades or test scores,
and school officials have stated that "student performance indicators are
irrelevant to their decision whether to continue offering sex-segregated
classes." 1 In Vermilion Parish, the program did not lead to better
education; the principal who proposed the program falsified evidence
that grades went up during the time students were in single-sex classes
when grades actually went down, and that there was a decline in behavioral
problems that he attributed to sex-segregated education rather than their
true source, "a state-mandated 'positive behavior support' system."320
Even aside from the insights regarding stereotyping, how the Court
has applied the intermediate scrutiny test and the ways it has used
empirical research do not bode well for the constitutionality of single-
sex education. In fact, every comprehensive review of sex-segregated
673 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (No. 3:08-cv-00004-CRS) [hereinafter ANA. Brief], available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Memorandum-of Law_2.pdf.
315. Id. at 7-8.
316. Vermilion Parish, 421 F. App'x at 371.
317. A.N.A. Brief, supra note 314, at 4. In connection with this emphasis on brain
research, the school sent teachers to the Gurian Institute, founded by one of the popular
authors discussed above, Michael Gurian. Id. at 5. Note that BCMS began denying that
it used such sex-specific teaching methods at some point after litigation commenced. Id.
at 24, 25 n.32.
318. Vermilion Parish, 421 F. App'x at 368; ANA. Brief, supra note 314, at 3,27.
319. A.N.A. Brief, supra note 314, at 5, 7.
320. Vermilion Parish, 421 F. App'x at 368.
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education has emphasized the inconclusiveness of the research as to
benefits, and this inconclusiveness is paralleled and echoed by the
inconclusiveness of the sex-based brain difference research. In addition,
the research has produced enough evidence of potential harm to cause
serious concern. Looked at as a whole, therefore, the research picture
increases significantly the likelihood that the Court will ignore the empirical
studies or instead use them to invalidate single-sex education.
Finally, and in many ways most damaging, is the comparison between
sex-segregated education and the sex-neutral alternative of reformed
coeducation. Although, as discussed above, the Court has not articulated
a least restrictive means requirement for sex classifications as it has for
race, its cases since Reed indisputably indicate at least that "the
availability of sex-neutral alternatives to a sex-based classification is
often highly probative of the validity of the classification." 3 2 1 Even if
this comparison is not enough on its own, when combined with the
various problems single-sex education has under other parts of the test,
this comparison has a "final nail in the coffin" effect. First, the research
reviewed here emphasizes that comparing status quo coeducation and
single-sex education, when reform of coeducation is proven to address
gender inequities and improve education for all children, is the wrong
comparison. Indeed, the non sequitur between "coeducation is sexist"
and "we should start a single-sex school" is a deep logical flaw.
In contrast, when the right comparison is considered, it is obvious that
reforming coeducation by applying sex-neutral techniques such as
curricular changes targeting gender equity is a more effective method of
increasing gender equity in schools. Such reform avoids the stereotyping
that comes from the very fact of segregation,322 as well as the stereotyping
spouted by sex-segregation proponents such as Sax and Gurian. In
addition, as the California single-gender academies experiment shows,
even when teachers and administrators have not imbibed such stereotypes,
if they have no training or knowledge of how gender operates in schools
and how to make education more equitable, they can inadvertently engage
in stereotyping.323 Moreover, the California experiment suggests that the
single-sex environment increases the tendency for this inadvertent
stereotyping,324 perhaps because the presence of members of the sex
being stereotyped cannot check such behavior the way having members
of the stereotyped group in the same room naturally does. The California
academies show that nothing about single-sex environments makes them
321. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 78 (2001).
322. Levit, supra note 10, at 521.
323. DATNOW ET AL., supra note 297, at 44.
324. Id. at 7.
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immune from sexism,325 and Faludi's account of the rampant misogyny
and homophobia at the Citadel indicates the exact opposite: that single-
sex environments can be rife with sexism. 32 6 Researchers agree that sex-
segregated environments do not necessarily promote equity when gender
issues are not addressed curricularly or pedagogically.327 So if teachers
need training in the gender dynamics of classrooms and other school
settings, as well as pedagogical techniques to deal with such dynamics,
regardless of whether that setting is sex-segregated, why not apply those
techniques in a coeducational setting, thereby avoiding the inherent
messages of inequality sent by segregation?
This question demonstrates that truly separate but equal single-sex
education is unachievable, at least as the Court defines it. In United
States v. Virginia, the Court made clear that equality was to be measured
by tangibles such as facilities and intangibles such as curriculum. 32 8
Therefore, under Virginia such curricular and pedagogical methods
would only be acceptable in one school if they did not differ too much
from other schools, including coeducational ones. This Article shows
that achieving equity through curriculum and pedagogy in coeducation
achieves better equity outcomes than single-sex education does, so any
possible gender equity promotion advantage to single-sex education goes
away if these methods are implemented in coeducation, leaving only the
invidious classification. The situation presents a practical catch-22 in
that the Court's jurisprudence essentially requires schools to implement
methods that are more effective in coeducation and thus cannot pass the
intermediate scrutiny test's comparison of sex-specific and sex-neutral
alternatives.
There are other practical difficulties. Although governments in the past
have regularly used administrative convenience as a justification for a
facial sex classification, no one is alleging such a purpose here. This
could be in part because the Court has roundly struck down classifications
relying on such purposes. 32 9 More likely, however, is that these schemes
are markedly inconvenient. Because all are agreed that mandating
single-sex education is out of the question, a public school that provides
single-sex education for any purpose other than compensation for past
325. See supra notes 216-18, 228-29 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
327. SEPARATED BY SEX, supra note 201, at 9.
328. 518 U.S. 515, 551 (1996).
329. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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discrimination must offer each student a viable choice between a single-
sex and a coeducational option. Practically speaking, this means at least
three classes per grade level. It also means three teachers, three classrooms,
and three sets of class schedules to coordinate. This might be possible in
a school large enough to support so many classes, if only the practical
difficulties stopped there. They do not because every child's choice to be
in one class or the other affects the gender balance of the coeducational
class. This is particularly an issue if boys find single-sex environments
less attractive than girls do, as the research suggests they do.330 If girls
overwhelmingly choose the single-sex class, the boys and a few girls
are left in a "coeducational" environment that is actually either all-
boy or boy-dominated. In addition, because the school has done all of
its sorting of students by gender, it cannot sort students based on their
academic strengths and weaknesses or other traits associated with learning,
such as speaking English as a second language. Finally, because of the
tangible and intangible equality mandate already discussed, there is pressure
to keep all classes operating at exactly the same pace, regardless of the
abilities of the students in the course.
Although these difficulties might not factor into the calculus in private
or even public charter schools, these schools are neither educating the
vast majority of children in a particular geographic school district nor
functioning as the last resort for schooling for all students in that geographic
area. Therefore, their experiences with sex-segregated education are not
really transferable to the K-12 public school context, as is illustrated by
the schools at issue in Vermilion Parish and A.NA. First, in Vermilion
Parish, the single-sex classes were less popular with boys than with
girls, so the coed classes were not fully coed, with the overall ratio being
73% boys to 27% percent girls. 33 1 Likewise, in A.N.A., BCMS had
trouble keeping class sizes balanced, with all-girls and coed classes
being generally more popular--coed classes being the most popular-
and therefore about twice the size of the all-boys classes,332 meaning that
the all-girls and coed classes did not get the benefits of small class size
that the all-boys classes did.333 This was despite both schools engaging
in "steering" techniques. BCMS sent letters to parents encouraging
them to choose single-sex classes.3 34 In Vermilion Parish, the principal
individually called and convinced over thirty parents who originally
330. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
331. Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 F. App'x 366, 370 (5th Cir. 2011).
332. ANA. Brief, supra note 314, at 8 n.7.
333. Id. at 39.
334. Id. at 22 n.25.
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selected coed classes to switch to single-sex classes."' Second, the school
in A.N.A. was not able to maintain the same pace and level of instruction
in both the single-sex and coed classes. The most advanced eighth grade
math class, for instance, was the all-girls class, and the all-boys and coed
classes "moved at a slower pace . . . and used a less advanced textbook"
than the all-girls class.33 6 The school's apparent attempt to correct this
inequality was to begin sending the all-girls class to the computer lab
and having the all-boys class meet more often; no acceleration efforts
were apparently made with the coed class.337 Although BCMS continues
its sex-segregated programs, Vermilion Parish ended its program in 2011
because not enough families chose sex-segregated classes.33 8
As these difficulties show, from an administrative perspective, the
sheer inconvenience of sex-segregated education versus reformed
coeducation damages the case for single-sex education. These cases
also demonstrate that such administrative difficulties hinder the
achievement of both better education for all children and educational
equity. When looked at through the lens of intermediate scrutiny and the
comparison between sex-neutral and sex-specific means, it is hard to
conceive of the Supreme Court upholding a classification that not only is
not more effective than the sex-neutral method but is actually demonstrably
less effective.
335. Vermilion Parish, 421 F. App'x at 370.
336. First Amended Complaint at 27, A.N.A. ex rel. S.F.A. v. Breckinridge Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 833 F. Supp. 2d 673 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (No. 3:08-cv-00004-CRS), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/womensrights/anav usdeptofeducation amendedcomplai
nt.pdf.
337. Id. at 28.
338. Vermilion Parish School Board Ends Single-Sex Program, FEMINIST MAJORITY
FOUND. (June 14, 2011), http://www.feminist.org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=1 3059.
Vermilion Parish is not the only school district returning to coeducation. In 2008, the
New York Times reported:
Lori Clark, principal at Jefferson Leadership Academies in Long Beach, Calif.,
which in 1999 became the first public middle school in the country to convert
to a single-gender format, is in the process of reverting her school to coed.
"We just didn't get the bang for the buck we'd been hoping for with our test
scores," Clark told me. "Our master schedule is like one of those old Rubik's
cubes. It's hard enough to make sure each kid gets this level English class and
that level math class-and then we need to account for if that student is a boy
or a girl? We just couldn't have our hands tied like that."
Weil, supra note 129.
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b. Educational Equity/Compensation for Past Discrimination
Besides the goal of improved education, the ED's 2006 regulations
may contemplate an additional important government objective of
educational equity or compensation for past discrimination. 33 9  The
second possible objective listed by the regulations is to "meet the particular,
identified educational needs of [a school's] students,"34 0 which could
include a specific educational need linked to past discrimination and
needing compensation. In any case, educational equity or compensation
for past discrimination is an objective that the Supreme Court has ruled
to be an important government objective.34 1
However, as discussed above, the Webster case is arguably the only
one where the Court has upheld a sex classification by applying the
intermediate scrutiny test consistently with its other precedents not
involving similar-situation problems and concluding that the classification
was in fact substantially related to the important government objective of
compensating women for past discrimination. A closer look at the case
shows the factors that the Court regarded as supporting its conclusion.
First, the classification, which was designed to compensate women for
the unequal pay they have received throughout history, did not "in
fact penalize[] women wage earners," 34 2 "was not a result of 'archaic and
overbroad generalizations' about women," 343 and its "only discernible
purpose [for] more favorable treatment [was] the permissible one of
redressing our society's longstanding disparate treatment of women." 344
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is questionable whether single-sex
education, even if only for girls and only to compensate for past
discrimination, could satisfy any of these characteristics. First, to the
extent that contemporary sex-segregated programs rely on the sex-based
brain difference research or sex-segregated education proponents' often-
distorted use of that research, the stereotyping evident especially in the
proponents' use of the research will present problems under the Webster
precedent. Second, even if some programs do not rely on such ideas, the
research on stereotype threat suggests that even a seemingly innocuous
suggestion of being stereotyped, such as filling out demographical
information prior to a test, can have detrimental effects on the
stereotyped group, both in terms of the group's self-perception and the
339. See supra Part II.B.1.
340. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(i)(B) (2011).
341. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam).
342. Id.
343. Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
344. Id. (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (1977)).
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discrimination that others may enact based on the stereotype.345
Therefore, to the extent that sex-segregated education gives institutional
legitimacy to stereotypes, the research suggests that it can have not just
theoretically but actually harmful effects on the stereotyped groups.346
Finally, in a public school district providing the majority of K-12
education, as well as the school of last resort option, it is likely logistically
impossible to allow sex-segregated education for girls only without
skewing the gender ratio in coeducation, leading school districts to provide
either de jure or de facto sex-segregated education for boys. Because
studies on traditional masculinity indicate that traditional masculinity
teaches boys to associate sex segregation with female inferiority, and
messages of female inferiority lead to such problematic behaviors as sexual
harassment and gender-based violence, where the victims are primarily
girls and women,3 4 7 K-12 sex-segregated public education could cause
indirect harm to girls and women. Such an effect would be the exact
opposite of compensation for past discrimination.
As if these problems were not enough, once again the comparison
between the sex-neutral alternative of reforming coeducation and the
sex-specific classification of single-sex education will likely prove fatal
even to affirmative action programs to compensate women for past
discrimination. The Webster Court made very clear that it upheld
the classification because "[t]he challenged statute operated directly to
compensate women for past economic discrimination."348 It stretches
credulity to regard sex-segregated education as a more direct method of
addressing past discrimination when one could reform coeducation so
that both boys and girls are educated together about that past
discrimination and have a chance to learn how to work together across
gender lines to achieve a better, more equitable future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Of the twenty-five agencies that have regulations that enforce Title IX
in some way, only ED has adopted an interpretation supporting sex-
segregated education.34 9 Even some of those who have counted themselves
345. See supra notes 248-50, 308 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 248-50, 308 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 171-72, 230 and accompanying text.
348. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
349. A.N.A. Brief, supra note 314, at 41-42, 44.
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as supporters of sex-segregated education, such as Rosemary Salomone,
who was recruited to write the regulations, may be changing their minds
about their support in light of what has occurred since the 2006 regulations
were passed.350 This lack of support comes on top of the "equivocal"
conclusions that ED itself made when it reviewed the research, looking
for support that single-sex education was a useful and beneficial method
by which to improve education.5
In short, only a tiny minority of any group appears to support sex-
segregated education, and the experiences of schools such as those in
Vermillion Parish and A.NA. suggest that the tiny minority is using
some very suspicious and troubling tactics, including distortion, stereotyping,
and even fraud, to advance their agenda. Yet despite these tactics, as the
Vermillion Parish and A.N.A. cases again confirm, when given a choice,
the majority of students and parents still prefer coeducation. Thus, in
passing the 2006 regulations, ED has given a governmental imprimatur
to sex-segregated education that is in fact not supported by the usual
indicia-legal, policy-based, political, or otherwise-that such governmental
approval suggests. Moreover, this imprimatur has led some school districts
to waste valuable resources experimenting with an expensive, difficult,
largely ineffective, and ultimately both unpopular and unconstitutional
educational approach. Their resources are wasted further when they are
sued due to their often inadvertent violations of Title IX and the
Constitution.
With regard to the constitutional question examined here, concerns
about single-sex initiatives from constitutional, legal, empirical, policy,
political, and resource-based perspectives are valid. It would be one
thing if there were evidence that coed reform was unrealistic or exhausted as
a remedy. But there is not, and contrary to one commentator's observation,
the methods and strategies available are not "a vague if optimistic call
for systemwide reform."352 They are concrete, effective, and capable of
creating real change without the dangers of invidious classifications. In
light of the productive and effective ways we could be reforming
coeducation, the valuable time and money that are diverted by single-
sex initiatives from the greater benefits of such coeducational reform,
and the fact that, even when given a choice, most students and parents
prefer coeducation, the question must be asked, "Why sex-segregated
education and why now?"
350. See Weil, supra note 129 (discussing Salomone's evolving view on single-sex
education).
351. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
352. Karen Stabiner, Boys Here, Girls There: Sure, If Equality's the Goal, WASH.
PosT, May 12, 2002, at Bl.
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Instead of supporting sex-segregated education, ED can and should
change its regulations to give incentives to schools to achieve gender
equity and better educational outcomes for both boys and girls through
the reform of coeducation. To quote one commentator, "[W]hy . . .
should [children have to] choose between bad coeducation and [a sex-
segregated] option[?]" 3 5 3 And as women's rights attorney and professor
Isabelle Katz Pinzler says,
To save all the babies we need to focus on both the equality and quality in
education for all children, all girls and all boys. Realistically, that means co-
education for all but a very few. So we had better make sure that that education
is as excellent and as bias-free as possible.354
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353. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Subtracting Sexism from the Classroom: Law and Policy
in the Debate Over All-Female Math and Science Classes in Public Schools, 8 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 1, 48 (1998).
354. Pinzler, supra note 10, at 807.
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